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Foreword 
Fake news, hate speech, bots and propaganda repress more and more the advantages of 
the internet, social media and free, transnational information flows. Especially the influ-
ence of Russia on foreign publics and the public opinion has been brought into the focus 
of global media since the US presidential election of 2016. Which instruments, narratives 
and strategies are used in Russian communication policies? Who are the main target 
groups? Where are their vulnerabilities? What impact does the Russian communication 
strategy have in selected countries such as Serbia and Estonia? How is the German sup-
port strategy in Estonia perceived? How should Germany’s foreign cultural policy re-
spond? 
 
The authors of this study precisely describe the current media landscape in Serbia and 
Estonia, the Russian influence on the public opinion in these countries and possible ac-
tions for European and German communication strategies. The study forms part of ifa’s 
Research Programme “Culture and Foreign Policy”, in which experts address relevant 
issues relating to culture and foreign policy with the aim of involving academics, practi-
tioners, policymakers and the civil society.  
 
I would like to thank the editor Stefan Meister (DGAP) for his excellent work and com-
mitment to this research project. Special thanks also go to the authors of the case studies 
Juulia Barthel (DGAP), Ruslan Stefanov and Martin Vladimirov (CSD – Center for the 
Study of Democracy) for their invaluable insights. In addition, I thank my ifa colleagues 
Odila Triebel, Sarah Widmaier and Anja Schön for their work on the coordination and 
editing of this project.  
 
The ifa is committed to peaceful and enriching coexistence between people and cultures 
worldwide. We promote art and cultural exchange in exhibitions, dialogue and conference 
programmes. As a competence centre for international cultural relations, ifa connects civil 
societies, cultural practices, art, media and science. Adequate politics need to be grounded 
on evidence and have to be reflected systematically. In times of shrinking free and liberal 
spaces in many societies, not only online, we have to understand the mechanisms behind 
and develop possible strategies to preserve those spaces with arts and culture for critical 
reflection, dialogue and international cooperation. 
 
Ronald Grätz 
Secretary General, ifa 
Abstract 
ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Understanding Russian Communication Strategy       6 
Abstract 
As a part of Russian soft (or coercive) power disinformation and propaganda have be-
come key elements in an updated Russian security policy since 2012/13. For Russian lead-
ership disinformation and propaganda have become key instruments to impact domestic 
debates in EU member states and in the neighbourhood of the EU. This policy aims to 
weaken cohesion in the EU and its image in the neighbourhood and has become so suc-
cessful because of the shrinking self-confidence of Western democracies. This study anal-
yses Russia‘s communication strategy with regard to its influence in Serbia and Estonia. 
What are the tools that are used? What are the aims behind disinformation and fake news 
stories? It shows that a formerly reactive response from a perceived position of weakness 
has turned into a well-executed communication strategy that makes use of vulnerabilities 
to sow discord. National elites in the target countries play a key role for the success or 
failure of this policy.
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I. Russian communication strategy: aims, instruments, stakeholders of disinfor-
mation and propaganda by Stefan Meister 
1. The background of Russia’s disinformation campaign 
Russia is a latecomer in developing an updated strategy on shaping the global infor-
mation sphere in the 21st century, unlike in that of cyberattacks, which have been instru-
ments of its security policy since the 2000s (e.g. Estonia 2007). The Kremlin failed to domi-
nate the national or international discourse on domestic issues like the Beslan terror attack 
in 2004, in its post-Soviet neighbourhood during the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 or 
during the Sochi Olympic Games in 2014. The catalyst for a more comprehensive infor-
mation strategy was a domestic event with the mass demonstrations in Moscow and  
St. Petersburg in 2011/12 in the context of the parliamentary and presidential elections. 
The regime interpreted them as being inspired from the outside, mainly by the United 
States. The rise of social networks, Western support for NGOs and independent media, 
public support for the demonstrators by many EU- and US-officials had a strong impact 
on the development of a Russian communication policy towards Western interference in 
the Russian public sphere. This was the moment when Russia started to invest heavily in a 
disinformation, propaganda and cyber strategy based on the view that in the 21st century 
traditional security policy has to be linked with the domination and manipulation of the 
information sphere.  
 
Much had been tested during the Cold War; the Soviet Union had huge experience in 
the areas of propaganda, disinformation, fake news and subversion. But the digital era 
gave Russian security and intelligence services new instruments to undermine the credi-
bility of the West without the need to offer an alternative model. Furthermore, the crisis of 
liberal democracies from within made Russian disinformation and propaganda much 
more powerful than during the Cold War, when the Western camp was more united and 
resilient. In the digital age the public in open societies seems to be much more vulnerable 
to the manipulation of information and to half-true or conspiracy theories.  
 
As a part of Russian soft (or coercive) power disinformation and propaganda have 
been updated in Russian security policy (Sherr 2013). Both terms overlap, are fuzzy in 
their definition and heavily influenced by a Cold War understanding, but have trans-
formed into the digital era. Propaganda can be defined as the use of arguments or infor-
mation selectively to either advance or undermine a political or public actor or achieve a 
political goal. It can have a positive or negative focus, depending on the goal. Disinfor-
mation describes politically motivated messaging designed explicitly to generate public 
I. Russian communication strategy: aims, instruments, stakeholders of disinformation and propaganda 
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cynicism, uncertainty, distrust, and conspiracy, all of which undermines citizen trust or 
confuses the public. Fake news are intentionally created non exiting stories or facts with 
the aim to discredit a politician, state or institutions. Disinformation is mostly not fake 
news, because it is based at least partly on facts or just drops parts of the story. It fosters a 
special version of a story or events that could trigger a political reaction. Both are used in 
Estonia and Serbia. While in Estonia it should create distrust under the Russian-speaking 
minority towards the Estonian state, in Serbia it is targeted against NATO and the EU. 
Disinformation is not necessarily composed of outright lies or fabrications, it can be com-
posed of mostly true facts, stripped of context or blended with falsehoods to support the 
intended message.  
 
Russian disinformation and propaganda are part of the security strategy and of the 
hybrid warfare that should support the military strategy in times of a cold or hot war. It 
was updated by the Russian general staff and intelligence services in 2012/13 after the 
return of Vladimir Putin in his third presidential term. Feeling under attack by the West, 
Russia’s leadership reacted from a position of weakness, using cyberattacks and disinfor-
mation to counter Western soft power and to compensate for conventional strategic 
weakness. The colour revolutions in post-Soviet countries together with the mass demon-
stration of 2011/12 in Russia are the main drivers for the perception of vulnerability and 
threat by Russia’s leadership, but it is also a reaction to the more general impression that 
the West is waging a media war and uses NGOs to prepare for a regime change in Russia.  
 
The Russian authorities therefore see their policy as a tit-for-tat response to Western 
activities; they argue that their campaign is not different to what everybody else is doing. 
However, while Russia had much more of a reactive strategy in the beginning, since this 
has been so successful in confusing Western governments and societies, a more proactive 
approach has been developed. This includes a shift of Russian international media outlets 
like RT and Sputnik from presenting a positive picture of Russia to the world to giving a 
different perspective on negative developments in Europe and the US trough disinfor-
mation and propaganda. Manipulation of public opinion in the West via social networks, 
troll factories, and bot nets while boosting anti-US, anti-NATO, and anti-elite narratives 
are part of this policy. 
 
  
I. Russian communication strategy: aims, instruments, stakeholders of disinformation and propaganda 
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2. Aims and functioning 
Russia’s disinformation strategy functions by trial and error. It is tailor-made to every 
target country and group, focusing on the narratives and bad news that work best in any 
particular environment. Many of the instruments used to influence publics and to discred-
it politicians, experts, institutions and the media in the West have been tested before in 
Russia and the post-Soviet countries.  
 
The post-Soviet Russian media was developed first of all as a system of public rela-
tions for the ruling elites. All mainstream Russian media is owned by the Russian state, by 
big state companies like Gazprom media or by oligarchs mostly close to president Putin. It 
lacks an ethos of balanced information, fact checking, difference between opinion and 
facts or an understanding of itself as the Fourth Estate in a democracy. Much has been 
learned from Western public-relations agencies or from TV channels like Fox News in the 
United States with its aggressive and biased approach. It is a self-learning system in which 
actors test and train what works best to have impact and implement it independently in a 
framework that is set by the leadership or client. At home and abroad, the system often 
operates in a public-private partnership with Russian oligarchs or businessmen as well as 
through the co-opting of "independent" hackers by the intelligence agencies. This often 
makes it more difficult to backtrack if Russian state institutions are behind a special attack 
or campaign. Especially in countries with weak institutions, corrupt elites and a symbiotic 
relationship between politics and business, it is much easier for Russian actors to influence 
public debate.  
 
The main aim of Russia’s disinformation strategy in Europe and the US is not, above 
all, to help elect Kremlin-friendly politicians (even if this seemed to be the case in France 
with François Fillon in 2017 or in the Czech Republic with Miloš Zeman in 2018 where the 
impression was created, that Russian propaganda, disinformation and fake news can 
make a difference); it is more to undermine the credibility of governments and politicians 
as well as to disrupt the functioning of democratic institutions or the media. For example, 
the Russian media and hackers use cyberattacks to obtain information about leaders they 
consider opponents and make it public via WikiLeaks and other websites, or they create 
fake stories like in the case of Hillary Clinton in 2016. But more substantially these actions 
are about the fundamental pillars of open societies and the trust of the people in their 
institutions, politicians and media. The strategy is to fuel already existing resentments, 
stereotypes and vulnerabilities in European and Western societies but not to create them.  
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Russian disinformation, propaganda and subversion seems to be more successful than in 
Cold War times, because the insecurity, self-confidence and trust in institutions in the 
West are much lower today than they were during the Cold War. Furthermore, it is much 
easier to spread fake stories and conspiracy through social networks today. 
 
This is especially successful in countries with weak institutions, oligarchic structures, 
underfunded and politicised media, corruption and the symbiotic relationship between 
politics and the economy like in the Balkans or in Southern Europe. To undermine the 
credibility of the EU or NATO, to play with resentments in societies or fuel nationalism 
are part of the policy. In countries where populists already challenge the trust in institu-
tions, in “the establishment” and in the media it is much easier for Russian disinformation 
and propaganda to further explore these vulnerabilities and to team up with populists. 
For Russian actors in this field it is not important whether the challengers of the system 
are right- or left-wing populists, the political or ideological orientation does not play any 
role, every actor who weakens the ruling systems and helps to undermine confidence in 
liberal democracies is welcomed as a partner.  
 
On the other hand, often underestimated in Europe, the Kremlin’s policy is very much 
about showing the Russian audience that the West is no alternative to the Putin system – 
however dysfunctional, unreliable and riddled with deficits – and that it is good to have 
Putin as a president who at least guarantees stability. This means, that the aforementioned 
policy is also regime stabilising and legitimising in times of an ongoing economic crisis 
and lack of reforms in Russian domestic politics. Simultaneously, it is about globally 
building up an alternative paradigm to the Western liberal value system. Russia’s disin-
formation accentuates the existing weaknesses of European and Western states and socie-
ties.1 Social media is key in this strategy and Russian-funded media outlets are up to date 
with all the tools of the internet age. It is much cheaper to irritate the counterpart and to 
improve one’s own bargaining position with an updated and aggressive (dis)information 
strategy than with any conventional weapons system. 
 
  
                                               
1 But we should bear in mind that this is not an exclusive strategy by the Russian state but also by other 
actors like China and Iran. They often act in the shadow of the huge attention focused on Russia. 
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3. Tools and means of Russian influence and disinformation 
The EU countries and its neighbours are important targets of Russian disinformation and 
cyberattacks, where different instruments are used and adapted to the national and re-
gional environment. These instruments of Russian disinformation are: 
  Russian foreign media outlets like Russia Today (RT) and its national branches, 
the media platform Sputnik including its radio station, internet and social media 
content.  
  Internet trolls who manipulate social networks and discussions in the main-
stream media, bot nets partly operating from Russia or countries not linked to 
the target country which often operate for private companies that are owned by 
businessmen close to the Russian leadership. 
  Cyber operations by Russian security services, especially the military intelli-
gence agency (GRU), which work with co-opted hacker groups like “Fancy 
Bear” in cyberattacks to gather sensitive information, often about politicians, 
that is then used to manipulate public opinion, especially in the context of elec-
tions.  
  Increasing political connections with left- and right-wing populist parties, na-
tionalistic politicians and groups in Europe through parliaments, think tanks or 
funding instruments like the Gorchakov Foundation.  
  Putin- and Russia-friendly national and regional networks that have been built 
up in the last 15 years, which now argue for lifting sanctions and recognising the 
annexation of Crimea, and repeat arguments of Russian propaganda, for in-
stance against Ukraine or about US influence.  
  Companies or their lobby organisations that cooperate with Russian (state) com-
panies, especially in the energy sector.  
  NGOs and GONGOs2 like cultural institutions, organisations like the Russian 
World Foundation, the Gorchakov Foundation or institutions like the Dialogue 
of Civilizations (DOC) Research Institute in Berlin (also privately owned) who 
fund or cooperate with pro-Kremlin networks or help to create them. 
Russia’s international media is in itself not the most successful instrument of disin-
formation in European countries; it is often a niche product (this is not the case for in-
stance in Serbia but true for Estonia) targeting particular groups. Much more important is 
the growing reflection and distribution of the content this media produces by populist 
groups, parties, and social movements in the target countries and also the instrumentalisa-
tion of Russian-speaking minorities as in the case of Estonia or Germany. If they are not 
                                               
2 Government-organised non-governmental organisation. 
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the direct target of the disinformation strategy, the content of Russian disinformation and 
propaganda is spread through these groups and networks with increasing success. At the 
same time, members of parties, but also leaders in some European countries, use argu-
ments of Russian disinformation and propaganda, while pro-Kremlin former politicians, 
journalists, or pseudo-experts bring them into the mainstream media via interviews or 
talk-show appearances.  
 
At the same time, there is a Kremlin policy to increasingly connect right-wing popu-
list, anti-liberal groups with Russian institutions and actors. The Russian philosopher and 
publicist Alexander Dugin – a key player in Russian intellectual debates about conserva-
tive national values, Russia's unique civilisation, and Eurasianism – has a crucial role to 
play here. He is used frequently by the Kremlin’s spin doctors to develop and maintain 
conservative networks abroad and shape the discussion on values and Russia’s role in the 
world at home (Shekhovtsov 2018). Dugin has comprehensive links with right-wing 
groups across Europe: for instance, in Greece (Golden Dawn) and in Hungary (Jobbik). He 
regularly travels to Serbia and speaks in other Balkan countries to media and the public 
(Balkan Insight 2018).  
 
Furthermore, we should not underestimate Russia’s policy towards Russian-speaking 
minorities abroad in the context of its Russkij Mir – Russian world – institutions and poli-
cy. Part of the Russian world are all people who “speak, think and feel Russian”, which 
gives a very broad and fuzzy definition for groups which belong to Russia (Laruelle 2015). 
Russian leadership reserves the role to protect the rights and security of these groups 
everywhere in the world. This is linked to a cultural, language and religious policy in 
which the Russkij Mir Foundation and the Russian Orthodox Church play a key role. They 
also spread the narratives of Russian disinformation and are agents of the official state 
policy. The Orthodox Church is key in the formulation and spreading of Russian leader-
ship’s values and foreign policy towards the Orthodox World which argues against the 
Western liberal way of living, for traditional family, against LGBT rights or the needs of 
minorities. It is very active also in Serbia. Here Putin’s conservatism builds bridges with 
conservative and right-wing groups in Europe and the USA.  
 
The main challenge is not that Russia’s media and security services have highly so-
phisticated new instruments to influence the European public. It is how they use and 
promote existing anti-US, anti-EU, anti-media, anti-establishment, and anti-migrant feel-
ings. Most elements of the narratives pushed by Russia already exist in growing parts of 
European societies, which criticise the inability of the governing elites to solve their coun-
I. Russian communication strategy: aims, instruments, stakeholders of disinformation and propaganda 
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tries’ problems in a more and more complex world. This self-doubt is supported by Rus-
sia’s international media, whose main goal is to “build up a counter-public as well as 
show media manipulation”.3 With this policy Russia instigates instability and polarisation 
in societies to claim power in the name of restoring stability. 
 
4. Challenges for EU response 
We have to bear in mind that European decision-makers interpret the threat of Russian 
disinformation for their domestic situation in very different ways. Countries which are 
geographically close to Russia – like the Baltic states, Poland, Sweden and Finland – have 
much earlier interpreted Russian disinformation as a direct threat (and were an earlier 
target of Russian disinformation campaigns). Thus they were faster to react with counter-
measures than other EU member states. Governments of countries with a different tradi-
tion in dealing with Russia like Germany, France, Austria and Italy reacted to the Russian 
disinformation campaign much later, only slowly adapted their policy and developed 
counter-measures like in Germany after the Lisa case in January 2016. This differs even 
more in countries like Hungary, Greece or Serbia, where elites have direct business inter-
est with Russia, the media system is mostly owned by business people close to the politi-
cal leadership, corruption and weak law enforcement institutions exist more widely and 
societies are more receptive to Russian propaganda.   
 
Furthermore, Russian policy in this field links foreign, domestic and security policy. In 
Western bureaucratic systems, every ministry has its own tasks which makes it difficult to 
pool coordination and responsibility. It is often very difficult to respond fast to fake news 
or a disinformation campaign because there is no institution or actor who has an overview 
or a supervising function and can act with all existing instruments. The success story of 
the Finish case is linked to the early decision to set up a person at the Prime Minister’s 
office who has the know-how and resources to react to any disinformation attack on the 
state. This person supervises all activities, has direct access to the top level of the state and 
can give very fast statements to demask disinformation campaigns or fake news.  
 
  
                                               
3 Cf. the self-description of RTdeutsch which wants to show the “missing part”, namely the information 
that is normally “withheld or cut off” in the so-called “mainstream media”. RTdeutsch, Über uns. Availa-
ble at: https://deutsch.rt.com/uber-uns/ [21 August 2018]. 
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5. Case studies: Estonia and Serbia 
The following two case study countries, Estonia and Serbia, offer very different political, 
social and economic environments. This naturally calls for different tools, narratives and 
strategies of Russian influence on the public discourse.  
 
Estonia is part of the EU, with a very EU- and NATO-friendly society, a success story 
in economic reforms and digitalisation. At the same time, more than 25 percent of the 
population are ethnic Russians, which live concentrated in the Eastern part of the country, 
close to the Russian border with a share of up to 90 percent of the local population and in 
the capital Tallinn with up to 40 percent (cf. Włodarska-Frykowska 2016). This group 
consumes Russian media directly, informs itself on the Russian-speaking internet and is 
therefore a much easier target of Russian disinformation and propaganda. The ethnic 
Estonian majority of society is rather Russia-critical, sees the big neighbour as a security 
risk and agrees with the importance of the integration into the transatlantic structures to 
protect the security and economic development of the country. 
 
Serbian society historically has – through the Orthodox Church and Slavic ethnicity – 
positive sentiments towards Russia. Good relations with Russia are very popular in socie-
ty and elites and the frustration about the slow progress of EU integration is growing. 
With the background of NATO bombings of former Yugoslavia, tensions with other eth-
nic groups and the rejection of the independence of Kosovo by many Serbs are important 
issues which are easily explored by Russian (foreign) media outlets and actors like Sputnik 
and RT. Russian business ties with Serbia play an important role, Gazprom owns the 
majority of the biggest energy company and is the biggest tax payer, even if trade is by far 
not as important with Russia as with the EU. Important is the image of Russia as a sup-
porter of Serbia, which is raised in Russian foreign media outlets as well as Serbian Krem-
lin-friendly media. The failure of the political elites to fight corruption, the existence of 
weak institutions and the lack of perspective especially for the younger generation com-
bined with fuelled sentiments in society caused by nationalistic politicians against NATO, 
the US, EU-influence and minorities create an environment for Kremlin-friendly narra-
tives.  
 
II. Russian influence on the media: a case study of Serbia by Ruslan Stefanov and Martin Vladimirov 
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1. Introduction  
The Kremlin’s support for Serbia’s cause in Kosovo and Russia’s rejection of Kosovo’s 
independence have been the cornerstone of Russia’s positive image and strong political 
leverage in Serbia in its most recent history. Russia has tried to carefully craft and amplify 
this image through strong political presence at the highest level and through a network of 
communication and media channels dedicated to promoting its image in Serbia and to 
fostering feelings of proximity and a shared vision of international relations in the West-
ern Balkans. This study provides an overview of Russian ownership in the Serbian media 
sector, discusses Russian media presence and influence on the local media landscape and 
outlines the key messages and narratives promoted by Russia in the country. It discusses 
the main actors and target groups on the Serbian side. 
 
Over the last decade, Russia has been committed to increasing its political and eco-
nomic leverage in the Balkans. Russian companies have taken advantage of the gap left by 
withdrawing European capital after the start of the 2008 economic recession to take over 
some of the most lucrative assets in the region. In Serbia, in particular, Russia has lever-
aged its political support for the denial of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence 
in 2008 to sign a long-term energy agreement to acquire the country’s largest company 
and to lock-in the country in long-term gas supply contracts and the South Stream mega 
project.5  
 
As is stated in the 2013 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, the Balkan 
region is of great geostrategic importance for Moscow, due to historical and cultural ties, 
as well as its role as a potential economic hub linked to Western and Central Europe. In 
this respect, sharing what is perceived as similar ethnic and religious origins with Russia, 
with its size and global position, Russia sees Serbia as a key pillar of its interests in the 
                                               
4 CSD (Center for the Study of Democracy) would like to thank Nikola Burazer, Programme Director at 
the Centre for Contemporary Politics and Executive Editor at European Western Balkans, and Nemanja 
T. Štiplija as Executive Director at the Centre for Contemporary Politics and Editor-in-Chief at European 
Western Balkans for their insightful comments and edits, and Eva Juric, CSD’s intern on Russian influ-
ence. 
5 South Stream is a 63-bcm/yr Gazprom-led pipeline planned to transport natural gas from Russia 
through the Black Sea, Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and Austria. The project was abandoned by Russia after 
EU objections against the related inter-governmental contracts and public procurement procedures, 
which were contradictory to the EU’s competition and energy law. 
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Western Balkans. In Serbia, Russia did not need to build up its economic power as lever-
age to exercise its political influence. On the contrary, it has had an open door in terms of 
political cooperation resulting in important economic gains for Russia’s energy majors 
(Conley/Stefanov/Vladimirov/Mina 2016). 
 
Russia’s economic and political strategy in Serbia has been amplified by the extensive 
use of soft power instruments that became increasingly potent after 2013. Traditional pro-
Russian and pan-Slavic attitudes in Serbia have been strengthened by targeted pro-
Russian media campaigns and the socio-political activism of pro-Russian groups in the 
country. The strong Rusophile base in Serbia is enabling the penetration of Russian infor-
mation and disinformation narratives either directly through Russia-owned or indirectly 
through pro-Russian media outlets (which often happen to be pro-governmental with 
regard to the Serbian executive too). Such outlets have promoted the Russian version of 
world events through different means, e.g. providing free Russian media content, empha-
sising perceived Russian strengths or denouncing perceived Western weaknesses, appeal-
ing to Serbian nationalist feelings, etc.  
 
Russia-owned media in Serbia and pro-Russian local outlets have used both propa-
ganda and disinformation to achieve political influence. Although the two soft power 
terms are sometimes used interchangeably, they define two slightly different strategies. 
Russian propaganda uses information selectively to achieve the desired political effect of 
Serbian government support for Russian policies in the country and the region. It could 
have a positive or negative connotation depending on the goal. The disinformation narra-
tives, on the other hand, are more methodically designed to create public cynicism, dis-
trust and generally confuse public opinion. Disinformation is rarely fake news in the sense 
that the facts cited in articles are at least partially true but are taken out of context or are 
blended in with false arguments with the goal of fostering a certain version of events that 
could trigger a particular political response. Russian disinformation has been masterfully 
used in Serbia to sow distrust of the EU and NATO by distorting Western political mes-
sages, shifting the blame for unsuccessful domestic reforms, inspiring conspiracy theories 
about the true intent of Euro-Atlantic institutions and providing counterarguments to the 
key points behind the support for Euro-Atlantic integration. 
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2. The Russian corporate footprint and influence in the Serbian media  
2.1 The deterioration of the Serbian media environment 
Over the past decade, the Serbian media sector has undergone a profound transformation. 
The state has used various mechanisms to gain influence over content and coverage. This 
influence in most cases has not applied to the government as a whole, but to specific indi-
viduals from the ruling coalition (Čeperković 2016). The government has allowed the 
media market to be run in a non-competitive and non-transparent manner tolerating the 
concentration of ownership in the hands of a few politically-related companies and the 
deterioration of ethical standards and journalistic professionalism. By neglecting the legal 
framework, the state has paralysed the relevant controlling institutions including the 
electronic media regulator. At the same time, self-regulatory bodies, such as the Press 
Council, have been ineffective in fostering journalistic professionalism and ensuring objec-
tive reporting. 
 
Opaque and incomplete privatisation has left many outlets under direct control of the 
state. The process, that started effectively only in 2014, has led to the shut-down of more 
than 30 outlets, leaving some 1,000 journalists out of work, and the sector demoralised. 
The swift process resulted in the rise of local media-moguls such as Radoica Milosaljević 
who purchased eight media outlets during privatisation. Two prominent newspapers, 
Politika and Večernje Novosti, have remained state-run.6 Additionally, the national news 
agency, Tanjug, although officially shut down in November 2015, still invoices its services 
and receives commercial contracts from state institutions, rendering its status insecure 
and easily controllable.7  
 
The difficult economic situation of Serbian media outlets makes them vulnerable to 
political pressure as the media market depends heavily on state advertising. The public 
authorities’ advertising budget reached EUR 174 million in 2016, the highest on record in 
the country.8 Lack of transparency on criteria for allocating state aid allows for the gov-
ernment to exert a hold on media outlets and push them to voice a pro-government agen-
                                               
6 Reporters Without Borders, Media Ownership Monitor, Serbia, available at: http://serbia.mom-rsf.org/ 
[21 August 2018]. 
7 Euractiv, Closed Serbian news agency with ties to government still publishing, 12/01/2016, available at: 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/closed-serbian-news-agency-with-ties-to-
government-still-publishing/ [21 August 2018]. 
8 Reporters Without Borders, Media Ownership Monitor, available at: https://serbia.mom-
rsf.org/en/findings/advertising-market/ [21 August 2018]. 
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da. At the same time, economic pressure is put on non-compliant media by selective tax 
procedures.9  
 
Russia has also taken advantage of the worsened environment and low trust in the 
Serbian media. The damaging deteriorating trust in media in Serbia has been the product 
of low media freedom, lack of transparency about ownership and financing, and the more 
general phenomenon of overall distrust in institutions, including due to the conflicting 
world-views and values of readers/viewers and those prevailing in the media. The loss of 
trust in media has also been the result of decades of, first, socialist, and then, during the 
1990s, nationalist propaganda that has made Serbs sceptical about the media in general. 
The trend has accelerated in the past ten years as traditional media with high-quality 
content has gradually been replaced by outlets quickly processing information seeking to 
offer the easiest explanation to events in the real world. Russian propaganda has tapped 
into this loophole by offering abundant content free of charge to cash-strapped Serbian 
media looking to minimise costs and replace classical advertising revenues with the pay-
per-click marketing model that relies on maximising viewership. 
 
Besides state advertising,10 another important mechanism of state control over the me-
dia in Serbia has been project-based funding through local municipalities, including jour-
nalistic grant awards to tabloids (Independent Association of Serbian Reporters 2018). 
Many media owners in Serbia are either directly connected to the ruling elite or are 
known to have adopted a pro-government editorial line to ensure their owner’s business 
prosperity.11 This trend became more apparent after the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) 
of current president Aleksandar Vučić came to power in 2012. The tabloidisation of the 
media market that saw the quick transformation of several new yellow newspapers in the 
dailies with the biggest circulation in the country, such as Informer (2012) and Srpski 
telegraf (2016), and, at the same time, the non-transparent privatisation of regional and 
local media, has left just a handful of independent media sources in the country. The 
                                               
9 Transparency International Serbia, Obracun sa Juznim vestima?, 07/08/2018,  available at: 
http://www.transparentnost.org.rs/index.php/sr/aktivnosti-2/pod-lupom/9930-obracun-sa-juznim-
vestima [21 August 2018].  
10 Transparency International Serbia, Inspectors pressuring Southern News and its advertisers in 2018, 
available at: http://www.transparentnost.org.rs/index.php/sr/aktivnosti-2/pod-lupom/9930-obracun-
sa-juznim-vestima [21 August 2018]; Reporters Without Borders, the State is the biggest advertiser in 
the country, 2017, available at: https://serbia.mom-rsf.org/en/findings/advertising-market/ [21 August 
2018]. 
11 Reporters Without Borders, Media Ownership Monitor, available at: https://serbia.mom-
rsf.org/en/findings/advertising-market/ [21 August 2018]. 
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general public does not know who the real owners of the largest newspaper publishers or 
TV broadcasters are as they hide behind a chain of offshore companies. In this media 
landscape, fake news and propaganda have become the new normal enabling the perfect 
breeding ground for a Russian communication strategy. 
 
2.2 Assessing Russian channels of influence in the Serbian media 
Russian entities directly or indirectly control around 12-13% of the Serbian economy, 
which, albeit showing significant presence especially in the energy and energy-intensive 
sectors, is still overshadowed by the EU-Serbia economic relationship, which makes up 
around three-quarters of the country’s external trade and investment flows (Center for the 
Study of Democracy 2018). Taken as a whole, the EU has by far produced the biggest 
impact on the Serbian economic development in the past decade. 
 
Until recently, Russian presence in the Serbian media sector was very limited. Direct 
Russian corporate ownership emerged for the first time in the spring of 2012, when the 
Russia-based company East Media Group (EMG) became the owner of 50% of the shares 
at the German media house Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung’s local branch (WAZ) – which 
was until then the publisher of Politika, one of the most influential mainstream newspa-
pers in Serbia. The holder of the remaining 50% is the PJP company, which is owned by 
the Serbian state and some smaller shareholders (including the energy company NIS with 
0.8%).  
 
Although the true owner of EMG is not known, the Serbian businessman Miroslav 
Bogicevic, a long-time donor to the Democratic Party, is believed to have been the person 
behind the deal, which was part of an agreement between him and then-President Boris 
Tadic to prevent large Western publishers from buying Politika, and thus allowing the 
government to maintain key influence over one of the main players in the Serbian media 
market.12 After SNS came to power in 2012, Ljiljana Smajlović, then-editor-in-chief of 
Politika, was removed from her position. She accused Aleksandar Vučić of personally 
controlling the newspaper and of ordering her removal (Nedeljnik 2016). The fact that 
Gazprom has been directly involved in the deal through its Serbian subsidiaries signals 
that Russia could potentially have a say in the editorial policy of one of the most reputable 
newspaper groups in the country.   
                                               
12 BalkanInsight, available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/new-politika-owner-denies-
links-with-democrats [21 August 2018]. 
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Apart from Politika, Russia has some small additional direct corporate footprint in the 
Serbian media sector. The Russian oil-company Lukoil, which has significant presence on 
the Serbian fuels distribution market, operates a small telecommunications company 
through an Austrian subsidiary, which could potentially be used for media purposes but 
this has not been the case thus far. Other Russian physical and legal entities also own 
Serbian SMEs and mid-caps (with an annual turnover of between one and five million 
euro) in the fields of telecommunication services, sound recording and music publishing, 
as well as web-portals. Throughout 2016 and 2017, information was circulating in the 
Serbian media and public domain that the EU- and US-sanctioned Russian businessman 
Konstantin Malofeev, who is a strong financial backer of pan-Slavic and Orthodox initia-
tives in South East Europe, had expressed potential interest to purchase a TV station, and 
potentially other local media. The pro-Russian businessman and current owner of the 
Nova TV channel, Bogoljub Karić, has also been associated with plans by Russian compa-
nies to take over key media outlets in Serbia. Pro-Russian businessmen have been another 
source of Russian influence on media in Serbia, avoiding direct corporate connection in 
the public eye. 
 
However, Russia has had a very strong indirect influence in Serbian media, through 
providing free media content, advertising, etc. There are a considerable number of web 
news portals that have appeared since 2012 which openly promote Russian political and 
economic interests in Serbia. Nevertheless, direct evidence of Russian funding does not 
exist and these news portals are hosted in Serbia rather than Russia. Tracking the way 
influence is exerted is difficult as the majority of such outlets are not even registered in the 
official Media Registry, which is a clear violation of the Law on Media, which was re-
formed to include a registry in 2014. Some of the media channels with the highest number 
of web visits and a pro-Russian stance are Novi Standard (www.standard.rs), Srbin.info 
(www.srbin.info), Vostok (www.vostok.rs), Vaseljenska TV (www.vaseljenska.com), Gazeta 
(www.vesti-gazeta.com), Istina (www.ceopom-istina.rs) and Kremlin (www.kremlin.rs) (Center 
for the Study of Democracy 2018).  
 
Some pro-Russian web-based outlets in Serbia have operated almost entirely in the 
shadows. Such is the case of the webpage of the Fund of Strategic Culture (www.fsksrb.ru), 
which describes itself as a “Russian-Serbian Internet web portal that informs its readers in 
a timely manner about current events from Serbia, Russia, the countries of the Balkans 
and the former USSR, monitor and professionally analyse the political, security, economic 
and cultural circumstances that affect the position and future of the Serbian and Russian 
state”. According to the Serbian Business Registry, the Fund of Strategic Culture is not 
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registered at all, neither as an association, nor as a media outlet in Serbia, making its mode 
of financing and its accounts non-transparent. Similarly, the webpage News Front 
(www.srb.news-front.info), which says that it is a portal where “soldiers-volunteers in the 
information front, are leading an unequal battle against cynical lies, deceit, manipulation 
and misinformation” cannot be found in any of the country’s registries. The web portal, 
which has an English, German, Serbian and Bulgarian edition, is updated on a daily basis 
and makes use of a sophisticated web interface. The majority of the texts published are 
translated from Russian to Serbian. Good quality of the web design and the vigorous 
publishing activity mean that these websites require a decent budget or at least a small 
team of journalists. However, no public information is available about their activities in 
the country. 
 
As in many other countries, Russia has also established official state communications 
and public diplomacy channels in Serbia as part of its global image strategy. The monthly 
magazine Russia Beyond the Headlines (in English), devoted to promoting information 
about Russia and the Russian vision of the world, appears in Serbia under the name Ruska 
reč. It offers news, commentary, opinion and analysis on culture, politics, business, sci-
ence, and public life in Russia. It is also part of the Rossiya Segodnya group of media out-
lets, which is owned by the Russian government, and also includes Sputnik. The printed 
edition of Ruska reč is distributed through the Serbian weekly news magazine Nedeljnik. 
The same publisher used to periodically distribute the magazine, Rusija i Srbija, as part of 
the right-wing, pro-Russian magazine, Geopolitika, until the winter of 2015. 
 
2.3 The case of Sputnik 
The most significant Russian involvement in the Serbian media sector has been the arrival 
of the Russian news agency, Sputnik, in 201513, when it opened a regional office in Bel-
grade. Sputnik’s predecessor was the web portal Voice of Russia, which used to broadcast a 
daily radio programme on several Serbian radio stations. The most important broadcast 
was via Radio Fokus, which was one of the several radio stations that obtained national 
coverage in 2006. Sputnik operates on the premises of Informatika AD Beograd14 but, simi-
larly to its operations in other countries, it is not registered as a Serbian legal entity.  
                                               
13 The editor-in-chief of Sputnik in Serbia is Ljubinka Milinčić, the former Serbian attaché for culture in 
the Serbian Embassy in Moscow (2002- 2006), and later Moscow correspondent of various Serbian 
media. 
14 Informatika is a Serbian company which has been a major provider of IT services in Russia. The com-
pany grew during the time of Slobodan Milošević, when it first established its presence in Russia which 
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Radio Sputnik operates in Serbian and has several radio shows: Sputnik News, World 
with Sputnik, Orbit of Culture, Sputnik Interview, Energy Sputnik, New Sputnik Order 
and From Thursday to Thursday. In Serbia Radio Sputnik is broadcast on Belgrade based 
Radio Novosti, a privately owned radio station with a licence for broadcasting the afore-
mentioned programme in the territory of the city of Belgrade. Radio Novosti is owned by 
several journalists: Milan Đordjević - 23.75%, Ratomir Krasić - 23.75%, Vladan Samardžić - 
23.75% and Andrija Dobrijević - 23.75% with a small number of shares belonging to the 
previous owner – daily newspaper Novosti - 5%. Every day Radio Novosti broadcasts at 
least five Radio Sputnik shows. Radio Novosti has a partnership network of around 30 re-
gional and local radio stations across Serbia, which rebroadcast the programme of Radio 
Novosti and Radio Sputnik. These radio stations cover almost the whole territory of Serbia. 
Apart from their radio programme, Sputnik runs an influential news web portal in Serbi-
an. Its published content is a free source, which means that other media can and do repub-
lish articles without requesting explicit permission as long as Sputnik is cited or credited. 
Moreover, what makes Sputnik so successful is its serious social media presence and its 
interactive design, which has prompted 100,000 downloads of its mobile application15. 
 
2.4 Serbian outlets with a strong Russia focus 
Outside of the official Russian media channels, Russian influence has been channelled 
through some of the most popular outlets in the country. Among them are the dailies 
Informer and Srpski Telegraf, and the weekly Pečat. The latter’s general manager is Milorad 
Vučelić, one of the closest friends of Slobodan Milošević, and its former editor-in-chief 
was Aleksandar Vulin, the Minister of Defence in the government of Prime Minister Ana 
Brnabić. These newspapers have expanded their coverage of Russian domestic and for-
eign politics, have glorified Russian presence in the Western Balkans, and have heavily 
advocated for the expansion of economic and military ties between Russia and Serbia. In 
addition, the pro-Russian Pink TV and radio network, owned by Jeljko Mitrović, who was 
close to Milošević and currently supports Alexander Vučić, have terrestrial stations in 
Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro and reach out through satellite broad-
casts to Macedonia, Croatia and other countries. Pink TV often attacks civil society and 
                                                                                                              
remains significant to this date. In October 2009, the state-owned gas supplier, Srbijagas, which is also 
fully dependent on Russian gas imports, bought 30% of the shares of Informatika for EUR 2.2 million. 
15 According to a 2016 promotional video by Sputnik; Šajkaš. (2016)  
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independent media organisations16, while boosting the image of Vladimir Putin and the 
Russian support for Serbia. 
 
Russia’s influence reaches as far as the sphere of social media. Young people in Serbia 
rank lowest amongst readers of printed press and yet, they represent a prime target for 
propaganda. Russian state-owned media including RT and Sputnik tried to capture the 
attention of young people in an attempt to dissuade their overwhelming support for a 
pro-Western orientation of Serbia. Pushing through a positive message to older genera-
tions about Russia’s role in Serbia as a protector of its interests has been much easier con-
sidering the deep historical roots that Russia has in Serbia’s common consciousness.   
 
A good indicator to assess the impact of traditional media on young people is to assess 
their reach on social media. In that regard, Russian media outlets have been very effective 
in using new communication channels. When compared to other news outlets in Serbia, 
RT is the 15th most popular page on Facebook with 163,000 followers and Sputnik is 24th 
with 101,000 likes. A number of somewhat pro-Russian media, such as Nedeljnik17, Kosmo-
pol, Intermagazin or Srbin.info, while showing more modest statistics, still reach between 
25,000 and 80,000 likes on Facebook. Also, Sputnik has been regularly listed among the 
five fastest-growing Facebook pages in Serbia18. The lay-out of social media has often been 
criticised for highlighting headlines over sources, which makes differentiation between 
fake news and news, reliable journalism and propaganda an effort that many do not want 
to bother with. Pro-Russian media’s popularity on Facebook is rendered more worrying in 
the light of the confusing space social media takes as a source of information.  
 
2.5 Russian disinformation narratives and impact 
What defines the main trajectory of the Russian disinformation strategy in Serbia is the 
fostering of nationalistic sentiments and the re-awakening of interethnic rivalry, in which 
Russia positions itself as the guardian of Serbian interests vis-à-vis Kosovo and of Serbian 
minorities in neighbouring countries including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. 
Popular media outlets including tabloids (Blic, Kurir and others19) have engaged in the 
                                               
16 BalkanInsight, available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/smear-campaign-against-media-
in-serbia-revs-up-11-10-2015 [21 August 2018]. 
17 Nedeljnik also republishes The New York Times and Le Monde Diplomatique in the same way as they 
do Ruska reč, as an addition to the weekly magazine. 
18 Socialbakers.com (2018). Facebook stats in Serbia. 
19 Blic.rs, Putin not using an umbrella, 22.07.2017, available at: https://www.blic.rs/vesti/svet/video-
putin-sta-ce-mi-kisobran-nisam-od-secera/qgvnktj [2 May 2018]. 
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promotion of sympathy and admiration for Russia, presenting it as the big brother of all 
Slavic countries (Šajkaš 2016). They indulge in the promotion of president Putin’s personal 
traits, the alleged superiority of the Russian army and the indispensable role that Russia 
has and is still playing for the survival of Serbia. The portrayal of Putin as a supreme 
leader with almost “superhuman” qualities furthers the impression that Russia is Putin, 
and Putin is Russia. 
 
Zooming in on the disinformation strategy exploited by pro-Russian media channels 
in Serbia20, one can identify three main narratives:  
 
Firstly, pro-Russian media in Serbia have been promoting the Russian viewpoint on 
international affairs including the interpretation of the Ukrainian conflict as the attack of a 
“fascist regime“ on peaceful residents in Eastern Ukraine, who have tried to defend their 
rights. The 2013/14 revolution in Ukraine is regularly presented in Serbian media as a 
coup directly organised by the U.S. (Sputnik 2017). In addition, pro-Russian media outlets 
have allowed journalists and political commentators to increase the popular narrative in 
Russian media that the foreign policy of the West towards the Middle East and Eastern 
Europe has not been driven by the goal of promoting democratic values but by egotistic 
geostrategic interests, most importantly containing Russia. There is also a powerful at-
tempt to create an image of shared struggle between Russian and Serbian people, with 
what might seem an absurd analogy between Crimea and Kosovo: war in Ukraine would 
be similar to the NATO bombing of Milošević’s Serbia; a Western attempt to violently 
submit foreign countries to its influence by instigating protests that topple governments 
which do not follow a strategy consistent with the U.S. and EU’s interests.  
 
Secondly, Russia-influenced media in Serbia aims to discredit Euro-Atlantic institu-
tions as encroaching on Serbia’s independence and sovereignty. One notable example has 
been the spread of false claims that the EU has been supporting alleged “separatist” 
groups in the northern region of Vojvodina (Vesti.rs 2015). The EU and NATO are often 
depicted as trying to force Kosovo’s independence on Serbia by using this issue as the 
main prerequisite for Serbia’s joining of the West.21 The benefits of joining the EU are 
constantly undermined in pro-Russian media in Serbia on the grounds that, on the one 
hand, EU accession would just help European businesses exploit Western Balkan markets, 
                                               
20 We analysed around 100 articles in some of the newspapers and online portals with strong pro-
Russian narratives that have been recognised as close to Russia. We also studied existing research in 
some of the main narratives exploited by Russia in the media sector of the region. 
21 For examples of articles, see bibliography. 
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and on the other, that the EU has not brought the economic prosperity it promises, citing 
Romania and Bulgaria as examples. Meanwhile, the fear of an imaginary Islamic or Alba-
nian agenda is fostered by alarmist news articles on events in the Serb-dominated North-
ern Kosovo, Macedonia or Bosnia’s Respublika Srpska. The exaggeration of small-scale 
tensions aims to keep the focus of the general population on nationalist grievances, which 
prevents wounds from healing (Srbin info 2017). The danger of this narrative is that it 
induces a change in the public debate that throws back to Milošević years: in today’s 
Serbia the merits of democratisation and its very validity are questioned by many (Brun-
wasser 2017). 
 
Thirdly, pro-Russian media outlets trump up the extent and solidity of Russian-
Serbian ties not only emphasising a common history such as their shared struggle during 
the two world wars in the 20th century and the struggle against the Ottoman Empire in 
the 19th century, but also the economic benefit Russian investment has brought to Serbia 
over the last decades. Gazprom has been regularly presented as a powerful instrument to 
transform Serbia into a major energy power in the region through the promotion of a 
large-scale natural-gas pipeline such as South Stream before 2014 and Tesla since then. 
The most recent reincarnation of the pipeline project, the so-called Serbian Stream, puts 
Serbia in the light of a potential future hub of natural gas in the South East European 
region. As the largest company in Serbia and the biggest taxpayer, Gazprom (owner of 
NIS) is regularly presented as a key supporter of the budget and one of the most im-
portant employers in the country. Similarly, Russia-influenced media devote a significant 
share of their economic coverage on the Russian infrastructure loans for developing Ser-
bia’s railway network, on the expansion of Russian-Serbian defense cooperation (Russia 
donating jet fighters, helicopters and tanks), and on the critical role Russian aid has 
played in responding to natural disasters. Pro-Russian Serbian media often spreads popu-
lar myths about the supremacy of Russian arms (mostly created during the NATO bomb-
ing campaign in 1999). The image created builds upon a strong public perception that 
Russian arms are one of the main conditions for the successful defence of the country. The 
Serbian government uses this perception to generate even more popularity by very vocal-
ly expressing its adherence to the expansion in military ties.  
 
In fact, there is only very limited objectively verifiable information about the military 
cooperation between the two countries. Domestic media has focused on painting the 
Russian donation of six second-hand MiG 29s and a small-scale model of an anti-aircraft 
S-300 missile as a great success. S-300 missiles have played a somewhat symbolic role in 
the Serbian consciousness as they have represented the resistance against NATO during 
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the 1999 bombing campaign (Sputnik Srbija 2016). Yet information about the terms and the 
actual quality of the Russian arms delivery has not been specified. Politicians have used 
this as a great opportunity for PR, which has in turn ultimately boosted the positive image 
of Russia among Serbs.  
 
Box 1: Strategic communication as part of Russia’s soft power strategy 
The importance of the pro-Russian media outlets in Serbia is not a mere consequence of 
Russian popularity but the result of Moscow’s coordinated soft power strategy whose 
scope embraces all areas of public life. A 2016 report on Russian soft power in Serbia 
identified more than 110 pro-Russian organisations, which are either directly funded by 
the Kremlin or are influenced by pro-Russian narratives (Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies 
2016). Media outlets, as numerous and influential as they may be, are only part of a wider 
Russian soft power structure. Political movements or parties, religious and student associ-
ations contribute to promoting Serbian nationalism that embodies a powerful anti-NATO 
and anti-EU sentiment.22  
 
Russia has been trying to strengthen the perception of a strong Russian-Serbian cul-
tural bond rooted in Orthodox Christianity and 19th century history of Russian support 
for the Serbian independence. The Kremlin, through the state-owned Gazpromneft (which 
owns the largest Serbian oil and gas company, Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS)) has financed 
religious initiatives such as the 2017 installation of a costly mosaic in the heart of Saint 
Sava’s church in Belgrade that has received much attention from the media, intensified by 
the presence of the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, at the inauguration.23 Gaz-
prom is also the main sponsor of the Crvena Zvezda football club, which has a huge fan 
base in the country. In addition, a special fund was created to restore the Russian ceme-
tery in Belgrade, which was inaugurated during a lavish ceremony in 2012 led by the 
Russian Patriarch Kirill.  
 
                                               
22 Bosko Jaksic for RadioFreeEurope, Radio Liberty, Putin’s orchestra in Belgrade, Belgrade, September 
18th, 2017; Kurir, 22/02/18, available at: https://www.kurir.rs/vesti/drustvo/2999945/kurir-tv-uzivo-iz-
hrama-svetog-save-vucic-i-lavrov-pred-velelepnim-mozaikom-centralne-kupole-srpske-svetinje-na-
vracaru [30 April 2018].  
23 Speech of Aleksandar Vucic insists on the “Brotherhood of the Serbs and the Russians that resisted all 
storms”, and highlighted the dome’s mosaic on Saint-Sava as the best place to evoke that Serbs and 
Russians “are from the same people, share culture, dreams and faith”. 
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Branch offices of the organisation Russkij Mir (the Russian World) and a representative 
office of the International Fund for the Unity of Orthodox Nations have been active in 
Novi Sad and Belgrade since 2005. In 2013, the same year that the Council of the European 
Union announced Serbia’s readiness to start negotiation talks with the EU, Russia opened 
a representative office of the foreign-intelligence linked Russian Institute of Strategic 
Studies (RISI-RISS) in Belgrade. Several Russian foundations have included Serbia in their 
programmes and grant schemes, including the Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund, the 
Strategic Culture Foundation, the Centre of National Glory and the Foundation of St. 
Andrew.  
 
Russia also supports the actions of the domestic far right and Eurosceptic organisa-
tions such as Dveri in Serbia. Meanwhile, there are a number of political parties that open-
ly propagate closer ties with Russia including the junior coalition partner in the current 
government, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), the Dem-
ocratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and the far-right Treća Srbija (Third Serbia). Russia has also 
backed a government, which includes openly pro-Russian figures such as Ivica Dačić 
(deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister), Nenad Popović (a Serbian businessman 
with extensive presence on the Russian market, who is also a Minister without portfolio of 
Serbia in charge of innovation and technological development) and Aleksandar Vulin (a 
vocal nationalist and current Minister of Defense).  
 
The biggest impact of Russian enhanced soft power influence in Serbia has been to 
gradually unite the voices of different seemingly autonomous pro-Russian players in the 
country. A unifying tool has been the Russian influence on the Serbian media sector. 
 
 
The repetitive glorification of energy, defence and railway cooperation between Serbia 
and Russia has overshadowed the coverage of the contribution of the EU and other multi-
lateral funding agencies to the country and the region. This is reflected in public percep-
tions. According to a poll conducted by the Serbian EU integration office, 25% of Serbs 
consider Russia as the biggest donor to the country despite the fact that EU countries have 
invested around 10-15 times more than Russia.24  
 
                                               
24 European Western Balkans (2017): 47% of Citizens support Serbian Membership to the EU, 6 Febru-
ary, 2017, available at: https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/02/06/47-of-citizens-support-
serbian-membership-to-the-eu/ [23 July 2018], Data is based on a survey, titled “European Orientation 
of Serbian Citizens”, conducted by the Serbian European Integration Office. 
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Not surprisingly, a 2017 survey showed that 61% of Serbs think that Russia has a good 
influence on Serbian foreign policy (Belgrade Centre for Security Policy 2017). Meanwhile, 
only 28% and 9% consider the EU and the US, respectively, as a force for good in impact-
ing the country’s foreign policy. Some 32% would support Serbia joining the Eurasian 
Union in a referendum, which is more than the 22% who would reject such a move. Serbs 
overwhelmingly reject joining NATO and would not agree to EU accession if the recogni-
tion of Kosovo’s independence is the price to pay.  
 
3. Conclusions for German and EU policy-makers 
То sum up, the direct Russian influence on Serbia’s media market is limited, since none of 
the major media systems is directly in Russian ownership. However, the indirect Russian 
influence on the Serbian media sector has been growing since 2012 and the ascendancy of 
Aleksander Vucic’s SNS to power. The Russian disinformation campaign has been ampli-
fied through several key channels: 
  the work of the news agency Sputnik (and its informal network of radio stations 
and social media outlets); 
  pro-Russian oriented web portals, many of which have not been officially regis-
tered as media outlets; 
  the tabloidisation of Serbian media; both newspapers and TV stations as cash-
strapped outlets use translated freely-distributed Russian content to fill up 
space. 
The latter is probably the most effective instrument for the spread of Russian propa-
ganda in Serbia. The Serbian government seems to have purposefully strengthened the 
pro-Russian narratives in tabloids such as Informer, Srpski telegraf and Večernje novosti, 
which allows the key bearer of political connections to Russia, President Vučić, to gain 
further credence in the eyes of pro-Russian readers.  
 
The impact of the disinformation campaign has been the steady growth of Russia’s 
standing in Serbian society. However, what has allowed this strategy to thrive in Serbia is 
the Serbian internal political context. The “wind of change” brought by the democracy 
protests in 2000 that led to the end of the rule of Slobodan Milošević has come to a stand-
still. The Serbian political system has deteriorated into a “stabilitocracy”25, which is epit-
omised by the degradation of media freedom and decline of the social commitment to 
                                               
25 Srda Pavlovic, Montenegro’s ‘stabilitocracy’: The West’s support of Đukanović is damaging the pro-
spects of democratic change, 2016, LSE Blog European Politics and Policy. For more on stabilitocracy, 
see bibliography. 
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democratic principles. Media outlets criticising the government have been labelled as 
foreign-backed propagandists, while investigative journalists have been regularly har-
assed by government officials and in the pro-government media (Freedom House 2017). 
The latter have also regularly attacked independent journalists accusing them of espio-
nage and of trying to destabilise the country (Transparency International Serbia 2018). 
Many of these conspiracy theories about independent media outlets have been directly 
borrowed from the Russian propaganda playbook broadcast on Russian official state-
owned outlets such as RT, Sputnik and Pervii Kanal. Ultimately, mainstream media chan-
nels dominating information distribution in Serbia have uncritically interjected in their 
news streams propaganda pieces admiring the government and exaggerating the close-
ness between the Russian and Serbian governments. This has amounted to a Russia-
influenced media capture that has reinforced non-democratic tendencies.  
 
To counter the malign Russian influence in Serbia and close the associated governance 
deficits, the EU has put forward the incentive of membership as a driver of reform pro-
cesses. The Serbian government has been supporting an EU path of development but 
without abandoning its close ties with Russia. In 2017, the US former Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State, Hoyt Yee, explicitly stated that Serbia “cannot sit on two chairs” in its 
foreign policy (Vuk 2017). Apart from the clear messages by Western policy-makers, the 
EU has been the biggest donor to Serbia with EUR 2.6 billion (as of 2014) in investment 
grants under the IPA programme.26 The EU has also helped develop local civil society and 
media channels although much of the funding has been absorbed through organisations 
close to the government (The Delegation of the EU to the Republic of Serbia 2018). Since 
2000, the EU has supported Serbian media with a total of EUR 33 million focusing on 
capacity-building of journalists, media literacy and investigative journalism. Serbian gov-
ernment officials have, meanwhile, harshly criticised EU funding for independent media 
in the country claiming that the EU’s goal could be to create chaos in the country. Germa-
ny has also been a big donor to the country with the German Federal Government con-
tributing more than EUR 1.8 billion in funding since 2000 for projects in technical and 
financial cooperation, sustainable economic development, environmental infrastructure 
projects and public administration reform. By 2017, Germany had invested a total of over 
EUR 2.2 billion creating 45,000 jobs in different high-value-added manufacturing indus-
tries, making it one of the country’s single largest investors.   
 
                                               
26 Statistics from the Delegation of the European Union in Serbia, available at: https://europa.rs/eu-
assistance-to-serbia/?lang=en [21 August 2018].  
II. Russian influence on the media: a case study of Serbia by Ruslan Stefanov and Martin Vladimirov 
ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Understanding Russian Communication Strategy       30 
Despite these numbers, an Ipsos survey from 2015 showed that 63% of Serbs claimed 
that Serbia’s interests are best served by maintaining strong relations with Russia, while 
the percentage for Germany and the EU was 9% and 12% respectively. Also, 36% of Serbs 
argue that Russia is the country’s biggest donor versus 21%, who would point to the EU, 
and only 8% - Germany. A similar 2018 survey by the same polling company shows that 
80% of Serbs (the largest share from all countries surveyed) think that Russia’s influence 
on world affairs will increase in the future. An opinion poll from 2017 conducted by the 
Belgrade Center for Security Policy revealed that between a fifth and a quarter of re-
spondents think that EU membership would have a negative impact on the economic and 
the country’s political stability. Just a third of Serbian citizens think that Germany has 
good or mostly good influence on Serbia’s foreign policy, while the share for the EU is 
even lower. Also, 50% of Serbs would be indifferent to an EU collapse and 15% would be 
even cheering. Another 69% say they would not support EU accession if this means 
recognition of Kosovo’s independence.  
 
The truth of the matter is that both the EU and Germany have found it difficult to ad-
vertise their economic presence in Serbia, while their political efforts to drive forward 
reform and reconciliation have been a soft target for Russian propaganda creating a 
speculative image of an EU plot to take away Serbia’s sovereignty. Unlike Russia’s public-
ly touted unconditional support, the EU and its members have put forward openly and 
have communicated very clear conditions for EU membership, such as the primacy of the 
rule of law and human rights, which have also been targeted by Russian disinformation 
very often.  
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III.  Communication strategy of Russia: a case study of Estonia by Juulia Barthel 
 
1. Introduction  
Although Russia does not pose a direct military threat to Estonia today, the relationship 
between the two countries alternates between overtures and tensions. Russia’s historical 
claim on Estonia being part of the Russian sphere of influence is based on Estonia having 
belonged to the Russian and Soviet Empire for centuries. This claim encounters massive 
resistance from most parts of the Estonian society. Contradicting interpretations of the 
common history in the 20th century, systematic instrumentalisation of the Russian minori-
ty in Estonia and fake news attacks pose fundamental challenges to the relationship be-
tween the two neighbours.  
 
Russia today makes use of a varied set of soft power instruments to maintain its influ-
ence in the Baltic States. It aims, still, to impact on the Estonian process of European inte-
gration by destabilising the country and discrediting local authorities. However, with its 
attempts of destabilising a single country like Estonia, Russia tries to reveal the weakness-
es of the whole EU fuelling tensions among the member states. With its military provoca-
tions at the Estonian-Russian border, such as violations of the Estonian air-space or the 
incident with Eston Kohver27 – convicted of espionage by the Russian state and sentenced 
to 15 years in prison28 – Russia not only creates tensions in bilateral relations between 
Estonia and Russia, but tests the EU’s and NATO’s reactions. At the same time, negative 
coverage of European and Estonian affairs in Russian media distracts and misleads the 
Russian domestic population away from the successes of a Baltic state in its transfor-
mation process. The Russian leadership has no interest in Russian society being aware of a 
successful democratic transformation of a post-Soviet country. Therefore, it is important 
for Russia to influence Estonia on a bilateral level. By creating an alternative narrative in 
local Russian media and Russian language media abroad the  Russian leadership aims to 
undermine the democratic state in Estonia (and in Europe as a whole) as well as the credi-
bility of the media, relying on the principle that Russian-British journalist Peter Pomer-
antsev (2014), called in his book “nothing is true, and everything is possible”. This strate-
gy of exposure of European weaknesses legitimises the Russian authoritarian regime at 
home while opposing the liberal democratic order of Europe. 
                                               
27 Eston Kohver is an Estonian officer of the Internal Security Service, who was abducted on 5 September 
2014 at gunpoint from the Estonian side of the border according to the official statement of the Estoni-
an government. Russia, however, claims that Kohver was spying on the Russian side of the border. 
28 Kohver was released a month later as a result of an agent exchange between Russia and Estonia. 
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This case study will give an overview of the key narratives Russia has created in Esto-
nia influencing the public discourse, describe communication instruments of influence, 
which Russia uses to strengthen its positions in the neighbouring countries, and evaluate 
the success of both Russian and European communication strategies towards Estonia. 
Expert interviews were conducted under Chatham House Rule on the request of inter-
viewees and are therefore not quoted by name in this study.   
 
2. Narratives and their aims 
The negative portrayal of Estonia in Russia was intensified particularly after the country 
joined the EU and NATO in 2004. Over the last fifteen years Russia has developed three 
main narratives about Estonia: i) Estonia as a fascist country; ii) Estonian Russian’s as part 
of a divided nation and iii) Russia’s claim to protect the rights of Russian-speaking minor-
ities outside of Russia.  
 
Concerning the first narrative, Russia is playing the historical card, denying the fact 
that Estonia was once an occupied country and labelling the country with fascist slogans. 
In Estonia, the narrative targets the local Russian-speaking minority, whose identity was 
built on the victory over fascism in World War II during the Soviet period. In its annual 
report of 2007 the Estonian Security Police stated that between 2005 and 2007 an increas-
ing number of pro-Russian events had taken place in Estonia. These events focused on the 
victory over fascism in World War II (Kapo Annual Report 2007). Partially initiated and 
supported by the Russian embassy in Tallinn and partially organised by local Russian-
speaking activists – among others well-known names in Estonia: Andrey Zarenkov, 
Maksim Reva, Dmitry Linter and Dmitry Klenski – they aimed at preventing an increase 
of anti-Russian movements after Estonia became a member of the EU.  
 
The perception of a growing anti-Russian movement in Estonia was aggregated by the 
fact that between 2005 and 2007 several acts of vandalism were directed at the Soviet Mon-
ument to the Liberators of Tallinn (publicly called “Bronze Soldier”). Both in 2005 and 2006 
the monument was defiled by unknown persons with Nazi symbols. Presumably, right-
wing Estonian radicals were involved. A movement called Nochnoj Dozor (Night watch-
men) initiated by local activists Dmitry Klenski and Dmitri Linter and a member of the 
Kremlin-organised youth organisation Nashi, Mark Sirõk, took an active role in protecting 
the monument. The situation escalated in 2007, when mass riots took place in Tallinn, 
after the government of former Prime Minister Andrus Ansip decided to move the mon-
ument from the city centre to Estonia’s main military cemetery on the outskirts of Tallinn.  
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Since then several Russian media outlets have been creating the narrative of Estonia as 
a fascist country, which supports Nazi ideology and perceives Russia as an occupant and 
not as a liberator. Media in Russia hereby refer to a yearly gathering of veterans of the 
Estonian SS legion in Sinimäe and send the message that the Estonian government sup-
ports the development of fascist movements in the country.29 At the same time, the fact 
that Estonia, due to Russian occupation, lost its independency during World War II is not 
reflected in this narrative as well as the fact that these SS legion veteran gatherings hardly 
have an impact on society. Although SS veteran gatherings still take place and they are 
not legally forbidden in Estonia, the movement itself hardly represents a security risk for 
the country or in any way indicates the development of Estonia as a fascist country.  
 
For Russians living in Russia the narrative of Estonia as a fascist country additionally 
serves as an example of how a democratic path after the collapse of the Soviet Union can 
be harmful for people and societies. Compared to a fascist Estonia, the current Russian 
leadership stands for stability and security for its citizens, a narrative which is particularly 
important in times of an ongoing economic crisis in Russia. Therefore, even ten years after 
the “Bronze Nights” in Tallinn, as the mass riots are called, Estonia remains connected to 
fascism in Russian media – a narrative which is often used by Russian official media to 
discredit other countries. This was also done in the case of Ukraine after the Euro-Maidan 
protests in 2013/14.  
 
The second narrative is that of a divided nation. This narrative is meant to influence 
Russians living in Estonia as the main target group. The Russian minority in Estonia 
makes up a quarter (25% or 330,206 people30) of the Estonian population (Statistics Estonia 
2017). After Vladimir Putin was elected as president for the first time in 2000, the Russian 
leadership developed the narrative of Russians being a divided nation since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Russians living abroad were redefined as “compatriots” and thus 
became a strategic priority. The term “compatriots” was defined very broadly and includ-
ed not only Russian citizens but also “ethnic” Russians, who had obtained a different 
citizenship after the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as those whose mother tongue 
was Russian but they would come from countries like Belarus, Ukraine, partially Poland 
and other areas of the former Soviet space. Later the term “Russian world” was intro-
duced, which includes all people who speak, feel and think Russian.  
                                               
29 Russian media outlet “inosmi” web-page, available at: 
https://inosmi.ru/video/20110802/172789815.html [31 July 2018]. 
30 Population according to ethnicity. 
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This narrative had a particular meaning for the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia, 
during and after the mass riots in Tallinn of April 2007. The relocation of the monument to 
the cemetery, which became a symbol of inciting a conflict on the different interpretation 
of history among Estonians and Russian-speakers, dramatically split society, strengthen-
ing the Russian narrative of Estonia as a fascist country in the eyes of both Russians in 
Russia and Russian-speakers in Estonia. Moreover, it made Russian-speakers in Estonia 
feel abandoned by the country that most of them considered as their home-country. For 
Russia, it opened a window of opportunity to establish Russia-friendly organisations and 
networks, promoting the concept of a “Russian World” (Russkij Mir), an idea based on the 
value of historical and cultural belonging of Russians all over the world to the Russian 
state, uniting them and building a new Russian identity (Krivopuslov 2016).  
 
The sense of a divided nation was additionally supported by the third narrative of the 
Russian state with the need to protect its compatriots abroad. During the mass riots in 
Tallinn 2007, the compatriot policy had little to offer to Russian-speakers in Estonia. This 
changed when the Russian government learned from this experience and in 2008 declared 
the protection of compatriots abroad as a new priority in their foreign policy. Discrimina-
tion and suppression of the rights, freedoms and interests of citizens of the Russian Feder-
ation in neighbouring states were suddenly among the three main threats to Russia’s 
security policy (Kallas 2016). Even though, in Estonia, Russian citizens make up only 
about 7% of the population, this change in Russian foreign policy is important for all post-
Soviet countries. Later in 2008, Russia claimed to protect the rights of its citizens in South-
Ossetia and Abkhazia, which resulted in a five-day war with Georgia and a creeping 
integration of these two territories into the Russian Federation.  
 
According to Russian leadership, the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia experienc-
es pro-active discrimination by the titular nation and therefore needs to be protected by 
Russia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Russia 2004). The apple of discord is the citizenship 
policy of Estonia, which, according to the principle of descent, applies only to people that 
have Estonian ancestors. The Integration Monitoring of 2015 shows that in Estonia about 
85% of the population have Estonian citizenship, 7% are non-citizens, and 7% are citizens 
of the Russian Federation (Estonian Integration Monitoring 2015). In comparison, at the 
beginning of the 1990s, the number of non-citizens was 32% (Estonian Integration Moni-
toring 2017). Many Russians living in Estonia did not automatically receive Estonian 
citizenship in 1991 and needed to apply for it.  Those who did not apply either took on 
Russian citizenship or stayed as non-citizens (in Estonia they are called “grey passport 
holders”). That is how the term “non-citizen” or “alien” emerged in Estonia and Latvia. 
III. Communication strategy of Russia: a case study of Estonia by Juulia Barthel 
35                ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Understanding Russian Communication Strategy 
This means that the holders of such grey passports do not have any citizenship and there-
fore cannot vote in parliamentary elections neither in Estonia nor in any other country. 
However, they obtained long-term residency in the country and can vote in communal 
elections. In terms of employment, restrictions apply only to particular positions (e.g. 
security service or diplomatic service), which require Estonian citizenship. This restriction 
is, however, applicable to all foreign citizens in Estonia regardless of their citizenship. 
Since Estonia became a part of the EU in 2004, all residents of Estonia, no matter what 
citizenship, have the mobility rights of the EU in terms of labour, visa-free travelling 
within the Schengen Zone and participation in European Parliament elections. The Esto-
nian citizenship and “non-citizen” policy was interpreted as an offensive act against Rus-
sians living in Estonia. Russian media and officials keep heating up this narrative, refer-
ring to discrimination, even though it is a domestic issue of an independent country.  
 
Whereas the older generation of the Russian-speaking minority can indeed be emo-
tionally targeted by this citizenship policy, the younger generations (born after 1991) are, 
to a vast majority, Estonian citizens. Most of them, however, attend a school where Rus-
sian is the main teaching language. Although the content of learning materials is the same 
for both Russian- and Estonian-speaking schools, Russian-speaking schools have a set of 
structural problems starting from poor Estonian language skills to an aging pedagogical 
staff. Thus these schools are less successful in providing scholars with modern teaching 
methods. Pupils are less successful at high-school exams when compared with Estonian 
schools and high-school graduates are less successful at entering universities and at 
achieving university degrees. The main obstacle in this regard is a limited knowledge of 
the Estonian language. To make Russian-speaking schools more competitive a language 
reform was passed in 2007.31 In the Russian Federation this language reform was inter-
preted as another act of discrimination by the Estonian state. This has further deepened 
the narrative that Russia needs to protect minority rights. Russian media argued that with 
the language reform32 the Estonian government had broken constitutional law. However, 
Russian media coverage never refers to the fact that this language reform applies only to 
non-compulsory high-school education and does not apply to obligatory secondary edu-
cation (1st - 9th grade), which is indeed under the protection of constitutional law. 
 
                                               
31 This language reform foresees the teaching of 60% of classes in Estonian or other foreign languages in 
high-school (Gymnasium) in order to provide students with better language skills and prepare them for 
studies at Estonian universities in the Estonian language. 
32 “Вся правда о русских и русских школах в Эстонии” (The whole Truth about Russians and Russian 
Schools in Estonia), available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rYp3oEH3xHI [31 July 2018]. 
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The narrative of fascist Estonia and the discrimination of the Russian-speaking popu-
lation in EU countries help the Russian leadership fulfil two primary goals. First, it helps 
to legitimise the Russian government’s foreign policy domestically. Second, it confuses 
and splits European societies. This improves Russia’s bargaining position towards the EU 
in other areas like the EU’s sanctions policy in the Ukrainian conflict.  
 
In Estonia, the Ukrainian conflict of 2014 and the following Russian annexation of 
Crimea and war in Eastern Ukraine disclosed not only a discussion about the security of 
the country, but also divided Estonian society. According to opinion polls, conducted by 
the Estonian Ministry of Defence at the end of 2016, 92% of Estonians support NATO 
membership of the country. Among the Russian-speaking population, membership status 
was supported by only 33%. On the contrary, 53% of Russian speakers believe that a good 
relationship with Russia is a better guarantee for Estonian security. This opinion is shared 
by only 18 % of ethnic Estonians (Nielsen/Paabo 2015). In its vast majority, the Russian 
minority in Estonia supports Russian foreign policy and sees Russia as a mediator in a 
world dominated by the United States. Therefore, the narrative of Great Russia has an 
impact on European countries and the Russian minority living there as we see more and 
more right- and left-wing parties in Europe seeking alternative policies and partially 
sharing the Russian government’s view of the current world order increasingly supported 
by these Russian minorities.  
 
3. Shifting communication strategy 
Today the political context has changed. Although the narratives described above remain, 
Estonia is no longer a target of influence on its own (as it was until its NATO and EU 
membership). Since NATO guarantees the security of the Baltic states by collective de-
fence and the socio-economic integration of Estonia into the EU has been achieved suc-
cessfully (especially after the introduction of the Euro shortly after the financial crisis of 
2009/10) the destabilisation of one single country makes little sense. Russia has shifted its 
communication strategy from individual EU countries to the whole Union because the EU 
is becoming an influential player in the common neighbourhood. Russia has not created 
and does not create new anti-EU narratives, it uses existing weaknesses and fuels discrim-
ination against minorities which are popular in many post-Soviet countries. Anti-EU 
narratives in Estonia are about refugees, sexual minorities referred to as “Gayropa”, de-
moralisation of the EU liberal order etc., which are applicable to the whole EU. And since 
the EU member states often have different approaches towards the same challenge and 
speak with different “voices” within the EU, it is attractive for the Russian leadership that 
a possible political destabilisation of one country could potentially impact other EU and 
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NATO member states. However, for Russian audiences inside and outside of Russia, 
Russia focuses on individual countries and specific stories to create a systematic negative 
coverage about the EU. It adapts its communication strategy to the conditions of the target 
countries with a significant Russian audience.  
 
Media coverage stories, similar to the German “Lisa case” are no exception in the Es-
tonian context. Russian media and other private and state actors falsify facts and create 
frustration among the population of other countries, which is supposed to lead to mistrust 
of all media while undermining the credibility of the ruling government. Additionally, 
online and social media allow fakes today to be spread with an incredible speed and reach 
out to a broad audience, with no time for fact-checking. Early in 2016 it was the “Lisa 
case” in Berlin, which created a wave of protest among the Russian-speaking population 
of Germany (Meister 2016). Early in 2017 a similar story of sexual abuse of a local girl in 
Lithuania by NATO soldiers made the headlines.33 In July 2017 a Russian girl, Isabella, 
was taken away from her family (who were Russian citizens) in Tallinn, Estonia. Several 
Russian media outlets reported that the child was taken away because the family wanted 
to move from Estonia to Russia and claimed Estonia was a Russophobic country.34 Both 
the Estonian Ministry of Social Affairs as well as the Youth Welfare Office admitted that 
the girl was taken to an orphanage due to anti-sanitary conditions at home.  
 
In Estonia, where the main channel of media influence is TV, television channels in 
Russian present one-sided, Russia-friendly and EU-critical news coverage and provide a 
media platform for pro-Russian experts only. In neighbouring Finland, for example, Rus-
sian communication strategy takes place mostly on the internet and, in particular, social 





                                               
33 NATO suspects Russia behind fake news campaign against Bundeswehr, Spiegel Online, 2017, 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/bundeswehr-fake-news-attacke-gegen-deutsche-soldaten-in-
litauen-a-1134925.html [31 July 2018]. 
34 “В Эстонии у русской семьи отобрали дочь из-за их желания вернуться в Россию” (A daughter 
was taken away from a Russian family in Estonia, because the family intended to move to Russia), avail-
able at: https://politikus.ru/events/96856-v-estonii-u-russkoy-semi-otobrali-doch-iz-za-ih-zhelaniya-
vernutsya-v-rossiyu.html [31 July 2018].  
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4. Media and communication instruments of Russian influence in Estonia 
Russia has continuously expanded its areas of influence in Estonia. It has been creating 
networks and institutions abroad. Moreover, it has been concentrating on building up an 
alternative media offer, covering Russia and Russian affairs from a Russia-friendly per-
spective and questioning and undermining the established media.  
 
Box 2: Building institutions 
The Russkij Mir Foundation began its work in Estonia on 21 June 2007, only two months 
after the mass riots in Tallinn, in April 2007. The foundation mainly promotes projects of 
cultural and linguistic exchange and sees itself in a similar position to the German Goethe-
Institut. One of the main priorities of the Foundation is to “promote and disseminate 
objective information about modern Russia, Russian compatriots and, on that basis, a 
positive image of the Russian Federation” as well as the “support of Russian-speaking 
and Russian media and information sources”35. The foundation supports local initiatives 
in Estonia, creates networks, and invites experts to Estonia who have a positive attitude 
towards Putin and the current Russian regime. What makes the Russkij Mir Foundation 
different to the German Goethe-Institut is the fact that while the Goethe-Institut promotes 
the German language as well as international cooperation and understanding (Völk-
erverständigung) Russkij Mir, the “Russian world”36 promotes the country as the only fa-
therland for people living abroad without including other identities and other cultures.  
 
Rossotrudnichestvo – The annual report of the Estonian Security Police of 2017 de-
votes special attention to a growing number of programmes aiming to reach a young 
generation of Europeans. Among others, participants from Estonia took part in some of 
the events organised in Russia in the summer of 2017. This is a new generation to which 
Russia is paying more and more attention by using its soft power instruments to influence 
the opinion of young Europeans.  
 
  
                                               
35 Russkij Mir Foundation, https://russkiymir.ru/fund/ [31 July 2018]. 
36 Russkij Mir Foundation, Quote: “Русский мир — это мир России. Призвание каждого человека — 
помогать своему отечеству, заботиться о ближнем“ (The Russian world is the world of Russia. 
The mission of each person is to help one's fatherland, take care of each other). 
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Impressum Club Tallinn37 – was founded as an initiative of journalists of the news-
paper “Komsomolskaya Pravda in Northern Europe“.38 According to the official statement 
the main task of the association is to support civil and public initiatives related to the use 
of the potential of modern media. The club’s activities are aimed at expanding interna-
tional information exchange on the basis of common European traditions and civil law 
norms, training journalists, conducting research, educational endeavours, publishing and 
other civil activities in the media sphere.39 Impressum Club organises events related to 
Russia, inviting speakers from Russia and spreading the idea of the “Russian world”. 
 
Vene Kool Eestis40 (the Russian School of Estonia), was founded in 2004. However, af-
ter the 2007 language reform was introduced in schools with Russian language education, 
the organisation increased its outreach among the Russian-speaking minority. The pur-
pose of the organisation is to support and develop the Russian School of Estonia – which 
includes pre-school, primary school and higher education institutions – in order to create 
the most favourable and effective learning environment for children. The organisation is 
against education in Estonian in Russian-speaking schools and acts to preserve Russian-
language education in Estonia.  
 
 
Influence on Estonian media landscape  
For more than a decade Estonian media and Russian language media existed parallel to 
each other. The general low quality of journalism for national minorities and poor offer of 
programmes (both educational and entertainment) in Russian let the Russian-speaking 
population41 focus on Russian channels. Similar to other countries of the former Soviet 
Union, in Estonia, TV makes up the main source of information for both Estonians and 
Russians. However, both groups consume different TV channels. According to the recent 
Estonian integration monitoring report (2017) Estonian Television (ETV) is considered to 
be the most important source of information for 84% of ethnic Estonians but only for 27% 
of Russian-speakers (see chart 1).  
 
                                               
37 Impressum Club, http://www.impressum-club.eu/index.php?page=mission [31 July 2018]. 
38 A small local newspaper, financed by the NGO Baltinpress, which received financial support from 
Russian official institutions, according to the Estonian security police’s annual report of 2015. 
39 Impressum Club, http://www.impressum-club.eu/index.php?page=history [31 July 2018]. 
40 Vene kool Eestis, www.venekool.eu/ [31 July 2018]. 
41 The Estonian Integration Monitoring distinguishes between ethnic Estonians and Russian-speaking 
population. 
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A new Russian-language channel ETV+, which was introduced in 2015, is considered 
an important source of information for 43% of the Russian-speaking population in Esto-
nia. For 71% of Russian-speakers PBK (Первый Балтийский Канал/First Baltic Channel) 
remains the most important source of information (Estonian Integration Monitoring 2017). 
Although it is officially registered in Riga, Latvia, most of PBK’s content comes from Rus-
sia. Officially, the channel is part of the Baltic Media Alliance (BMA), an international 
media group, operating in three Baltic countries. BMA is the Baltic’s market leader in 
terms of media outlets, specifically targeting national minorities. According to their own 
statement, BMA provides the audience with programmes and motion pictures from lead-
ing Russian and Western producers.42 Although the channel claims to be independent, 
there is a strong similarity to the First Russian Channel. The main difference between the 
First Russian Channel and First Baltic Channel is the news section. Russian news are 
replaced by the local Estonian/Latvian news and tend to favour a more Russian-friendly 
news coverage. PBK’s news section is considered to be important for 70% of the Russian-
speaking population. In comparison, the Estonian news section Aktuaalne Kaamera, broad-
cast in Russian on the newly introduced ETV+ is important for 63% of Russian-speakers.   
 
 
Chart 1: Media channels in order of importance for the Russian-speaking population and Estonians, percentage 
Source: Estonian Integration Monitoring (Eesti integratsiooni monitooring) (2017) 
 
                                               
42 Baltic Media Alliance, http://en.1bma.lv/en/about-holding/ [31 July 2018] [31 July 2018]. 
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The latest integration monitoring report (2017) shows that Russian TV channels are 
considered as important sources of information for 71% of Russian speakers in Estonia. 
One of the two national channels of the Russian Federation, Rossiya, and two private 
channels, NTV and RTV, are the most popular Russian-based information and entertain-
ment sources among the Russian-speaking population in Estonia. Rossiya states that it has 
a media coverage of 98.5% among the Russian population in Russia and that more than  
50 million people watch the channel in CIS countries and the Baltic States.43 The news 
programme Vesti is the oldest news programme on Russian television and enjoys popular-
ity inside and outside of the country.  
 
For a long time, the local Estonian newspaper and radio landscape was less attractive 
for the Russian population in Estonia compared to Russian media. Estonia National 
Broadcasting (ERR) and the biggest Estonian Newspapers Eesti Päevaleht, Postimees and 
Eesti Ekspress used to publish in Estonian and therefore were not consumed by many 
Russian-speakers. The exception was Radio 4, which belongs to ERR and was established 
as a Russian-language radio channel, providing qualitatively good content for the local 
minority. Until today, the radio station is considered as an important source of infor-
mation for 38% of Russian speakers.  
 
In early 2000 some first attempts to bring both groups together emerged. The online 
tabloid Delfi and Rus Delfi aimed to provide the whole of the Estonian population with the 
same content but in different languages. Postimees started their Russian version of a print-
ed newspaper in 2005 but soon re-arranged itself as an online medium. Today, both Rus 
Delfi and RusPostimees are the most popular (54%) Estonian sources of information among 
Russian speakers in the country. To a lesser extent, the Russian-speaking minority in 
Estonia follows European or international media (around 19%) such as CNN or BBC – and 
this mostly in their Russian language versions (Estonian Integration Monitoring 2017).  
 
Language barriers and the absence of home-based TV-productions in Russian com-
bined with different mentalities in media consumption and contradictory attitudes to-
wards the Estonian state (in particular regarding aspects of history) resulted in two paral-
lel media spaces in Estonia. PBK officially aimed to fill this gap, however, its content and 
coverage rather followed the idea of a “Russian World”, than providing the minority 
group with objective, alternative information on Estonia. Russia was successful in using 
this gap and instrumentalising the Russian minority in Estonia by providing them with 
                                               
43 Rossiya TV official web-page, https://russia.tv/article/show/article_id/7481/ [31 July 2018]. 
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negative coverage through all the above described narratives. Thus, the overall tendency 
can be summed up as such: the better Estonia proceeds in EU integration, the more nega-
tive the coverage of state affairs becomes.  
 
In December 2013 a new media company – Rossija Segodnja (Russia Today, RT) – was 
created on the basis of the former RIA Novosti and Golos Rossii (The Voice of Russia). A 
year later the radio station Sputnik entered the market, spreading a positive image of 
Russia via radio and the internet in 35 different languages. In the Baltic countries RT has 
been active since 2015. However, neither RT nor Sputnik have been very successful in the 
Estonian media landscape. RT provides bad quality Estonian language texts, mostly trans-
lations, which are not considered a reputable source of information for Estonian-speakers. 
 
With regard to news information online and social media still play a secondary role in 
Estonia compared to TV. However, the number of social media users has increased in 
recent years and, according to researchers, the tendency will grow. As for now, online and 
social media are considered to be important sources of information for 61% (online media) 
and 43% (social media) of Estonians (see chart 1). Among the Russian-speaking popula-
tion online media is an important source for 54% and social media for 48% (Estonian 
Integration Monitoring 2017). However, a huge difference can be observed between gen-
erations. Among the younger people the rate of consumption of online and social media is 
as high as 90%. Among the Russian-speaking population in Estonia, both Facebook (43%) 
and Russian social media such as Odnoklassniki (33%) and VKontakte (26%) are popular.  
 
The role of social media will certainly increase even more, thus a Russian communica-
tion strategy will try to target more Russian-speaking young people through these chan-
nels. At the moment there is very little evidence and a big research gap on reliable data 
and case studies on Russian communication activities and possible influence via Od-
noklassniki and VKontakte. A recent research study, “Robotrolling”, conducted by NATO’s 
strategic Communications Center of Excellence, on the use of Twitter in the Baltic states, 
showed that about 63% of all Russian language posts on NATO activities in Estonia were 
automatically generated (NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence 2018). 
Facebook and Twitter monitor fake news and robotrolling and regularly delete automati-
cally generated content. But with regard to Russian social media platforms like Odnoklass-
niki and VKontakte there is a lack of information on how they deal with this issue.  
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5. Estonian resilience 
2007 not only revealed a window of opportunity for the Russian leadership to continue its 
influence activities in the Baltic states, but it also showed the Estonian leadership their 
vulnerabilities. It became clear that segregated school education and different media land-
scapes created parallel societies in Estonia. There is a need for a common education and 
information space as well as a more comprehensive integration policy, which would con-
centrate not only on the knowledge of the official language (as the first integration policy 
did) but also on developing a sense of belonging to Estonia. 
 
5.1 Integration of the Russian-speaking minority 
The Russian-speaking minority today is no longer homogenous. After the mass riots in 
Tallinn in April 2007 the Estonian state re-shaped its integration policy, which supported 
a process of differentiation. Already in 2011 a research paper, ordered by the Estonian 
Ministry of Culture and conducted by private statistical companies and the University of 
Tartu, could clearly identify different attitudes towards the Estonian state and the Estoni-
an population among the Russian-speaking minority. Moreover, this paper also identifies 
their ability to adapt to the new society and to become successful in the socio-economic 
structures of Estonia. Based on the integration success, five categories can be distin-
guished:  
 
  Successfully integrated (21%) – mostly members of the younger generation, born 
and grown up in the independent Estonian Republic. They speak the Estonian 
language fluently and are successful on the job market. Most of them are citizens 
of Estonia and feel part of the Estonian society. They have trust in the state, live 
and work in an Estonian environment, follow Estonian media (and partially pre-
fer it) 
  Russian-speaking patriots of Estonia (16%) – middle-aged people who are not 
doing very well economically and whose attitudes tend to be pessimistic. They 
have a weak knowledge of the official language but indicate Estonia as their on-
ly homeland and are open towards ethnical Estonians. 
  Russian natives and Estonian-speakers: active but critical (13%) – mostly young 
people, economically well-protected, speak fluent Estonian, but rarely use the of-
ficial language, have most of their socio-economic ties among other Russian-
speakers, they identify with other countries (including Russia) as their home and 
only half of them have Estonian citizenship. Although they follow Estonian me-
dia, they are critical and tend to distrust it. They are politically inactive and are 
ready to leave the country. 
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  Low-integrated (29%) – mostly Russian-speaking elderly people, unemployed or 
employed in low-paid sectors (working-class). Their Estonian language skills are 
often poor; most of them have no citizenship, often excused by their poor Esto-
nian language skills and their incapability to learn the official language. They 
mistrust the state; the lack of security and general pessimism are key characteris-
tics of this group. They usually consume the local Russian-speaking media or 
media of the Russian Federation.  
  Passive, non-integrated (22%) – mostly elderly people, with no skills of the Esto-
nian language, mostly living in the North-Easterly region of Estonia bordering 
Russia (Ida-Virumaa). Most of them are citizens of the Russian Federation. They 
have a lower level of education and identify strongly with Russia as their only 
homeland. They are socially passive and are not interested in life in Estonia and 
its society, their main source of information is Russian television (Estonian Inte-
gration Monitoring 2011). 
The studies conducted in the last five years (among others, the Study on Integration of 
Social Groups (Rikmann/Himmelfeldt 2013), impact of language training development 
programmes (Estonian Integration and Migration Foundation 2013), the impact of partici-
pation of ethnic minorities in national cultural activities to their ethnic identity (Makarova 
2017) show that a third (35%) of Russian Federation citizens living in Estonia and almost 
two thirds (67%) of people with non-citizenship status identify Estonia as the only home 
country. Russia as the only home country is seen by 42% of Russian Federation citizens, 
living permanently in Estonia and 16% of residents with non-citizenship. At the same 
time, 10% of non-ethnical Estonian citizens claim Russia to be their only home country (as 
opposed to 76% of the same category, who perceive Estonia as the only home country). 
Within the younger generation, aged between 15 and 35, 70-80% of respondents declare 
Estonia their only home. Belonging to Russia is seen more as a historical (Soviet) heritage 
through language and culture (at about 50 to 70% in all age categories) (Estonian Integra-
tion Monitoring 2011).  
 
The success of the integration policy had a direct impact on the Russian instruments of 
influence. The awareness among the Russian-speaking population of the Russian policy of 
“compatriots” is low. About 65% of Russian-speaking Estonians claim to have little 
knowledge of the activity of this movement. Only 8.5% confirm their knowledge to be 
good (Kallas 2016). Institutions like Rossotrudnichestvo and the Foundation Russkij Mir 
have a limited impact in Estonia. These have little to offer for the Russian-speaking minor-
ity in Estonia. Radical pro-Russian actors such as Nochnoj Dozor, who strongly promote 
the idea of Russkij Mir, have a marginalised outreach with little significance in society. The 
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Russian Party, or Vene Erakond Eestis which was founded at the beginning of the 1990s to 
protect the interests of the Russian-speaking population, continually fails to reach 5% 
during elections. The fact that the Russian minority in Estonia has become so versatile 
makes Russian policies less successful. Current Russian activities are more likely to be 
successful among a smaller group of less educated and less integrated Russian-speaking 
people, coming from poorer regions. 
 
Well-integrated and patriotic young people have become more and more engaged in 
Estonian affairs. The Estonian narrative of Russians seen as foreigners or foes has shifted. 
At the last TEDx Conference in March 2018 in Tallinn in Lasnamäe44, the President of 
Estonia, Kersti Kaljulaid spoke – in Russian – about the key to success in a free society.45 
This was the first time a president of an independent Estonia held a speech completely in 
Russian. This speech has an enormous value for the development and improvement of the 
Estonian-Russian relationship.  
 
 
5.2 Institutional StratCom 
At the institutional level, Estonia is aiming to achieve a sustained, institution-based and 
not person-based strategic communication policy. For this purpose, the governmental 
office under Prime Minister Jüri Ratas decided in 2017 to scale up the existing department 
of strategic communication. Starting from 2018, the overall budget of the department will 
increase from a yearly budget of EUR 60,000 to EUR 800,000 and increase its staff by an 
additional eight persons, which is a large increase given the fact that Estonia is a country 
of 1.3 million inhabitants. This department unites and coordinates the work of ministries 
and other public institutes, informs the public about the security situation, coordinates 
crisis management, exposes fake information and prevents its spread.  
 
In addition to StratCom some ministries of Estonia created positions of Russian-
speaking press officers, dealing exclusively with issues on revealing propaganda and 
disinformation and developing counter-activities. At the moment the Ministry of Social 
Affairs, the Estonian Police Department, the Ministry of Defence, the Estonian Army and 
Ministry of Education have created these positions. They work closely with StratCom, 
creating a common strategy and counter activities.  
                                               
44 Mostly inhabited by Russian-speakers. 
45 ETV+ Media Channel, “Керсти Кальюлайд на конференции ТEDxLasnamäe говорила о важности 
образования“ (Kersti Kaljulaid spoke about the importance of education during TEDxLasnamäe Confer-
ence), available at: https://etvpluss.err.ee/v/f89be429-fba8-440e-a58b-1cd750897e57 [31 July 2018]  
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5.3 Building regional Russian language media 
One of the lessons learned from the mass riots in April 2007 was the need to reduce the 
information gap between the Estonian media and the negative narratives about Estonia 
promoted on Russian TV. It became evident that knowledge of the Estonian language is 
not a guarantee of consumption of Estonian media. The Russian minority in Estonia need-
ed a professional, Estonian-based, Russian-speaking channel, which would provide this 
target group with information about the current affairs of Estonia.  
 
The first attempt to launch ETV2 as a mixed-language channel, to provide information 
in both Estonian and Russian, took place right after the relaunch of a new integration 
policy in 2008. The aim of this channel was to provide a mixed-language programme, 
bringing both target groups closer together. The news section Aktuaalne Kaamera in Rus-
sian was integrated into the contents of the channel. Other broadcasts were bilingual. 
However, the channel did not last long. It was extremely costly to keep up a bilingual 
channel and the needs of both target groups were too diverse for a common production. 
The lack of professionalism with regard to local Russian-speaking journalists and simply 
boring content did not get the expected attention. Moreover, opinion polls showed a ra-
ther negative attitude among the Estonian-speaking population towards a Russian-
language channel, which would be integrated into the Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR) 
organisation. It was hard to explain to an ordinary Estonian tax payer, why, after the mass 
riots of 2007 in Tallinn, they needed to pay taxes for an additional Russian-language 
channel.  
 
The conflict in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2013/14 made Estonians re-
think their attitude. In 2015 a new channel, ETV+, went on air as part of ERR. The aim of 
the channel was to provide the Russian-speaking minority with current affairs pro-
grammes in Estonia, made by the local Russian-speaking minority. ETV2 was projected as 
a mixed-language channel, providing different content in different languages (Estonian, 
Russian and partially English), but ETV+ aims to approach a Russian-speaking audience, 
providing content produced in Estonia in Russian. At the moment, three years after the 
launch of the channel, it is too early to evaluate the success or failure of the channel. Ac-
cording to interviewed experts for this study, the establishment of a TV channel and 
breaking habits in media consumption takes about ten years’ time. As for now, the expert 
opinion on the work of ETV+ is divided. Some experts claim that ETV+ does not achieve 
its aim, since the majority of the Russian-speaking population still relies on Russian 
sources. On the other hand, other experts indicate that the number of people watching 
Aktuaalne Kaamera in Russian has doubled. According to statistics of the integration moni-
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toring report 2017, about 62% of the Russian-speaking minority follow Aktuaalne Kaamera. 
About 70% of the Russian-speaking population indicates that the launch of ETV+ was 
important (Estonian Integration Monitoring 2017).   
 
The small budget of ERR, limited proficiency of local journalists and a narrow out-
reach are obstacles for further development of the channel. It is not aiming to compete 
with Russian channels, which have completely different budgets and resources. The aim 
of the channel is rather to increase ownership among the Russian-speaking population in 
Estonia, challenging the victim-narrative and giving them an opportunity to create their 
own product, to be involved actively in Estonian social and political life.  
 
5.4  German and European contribution  
Out of all member states and allies of Estonia, most contributions come from the United 
States, the UK, Sweden, Norway and Germany.46 Mostly the embassies of these countries 
support activities aimed to strengthen the role of civil society and promote European 
integration. Language courses, youth summer camps, the development of local initiatives 
in the regions, youth exchanges and networking are the main areas of foreign activities in 
Estonia. The UK and Germany contribute to the development of the media landscape in 
Estonia, aiming to increase its professionalism and outreach and to strengthen the net-
works of journalists on an informal level.    
 
Although the areas of foreign contribution by the Nordic Embassies, the UK, Germany 
and USA are similar, their approaches towards the target groups are different. The USA 
and UK work exclusively on projects with the Russian-speaking population in Estonia, 
aiming to minimise their vulnerabilities by addressing their direct needs. For the sustain-
able development of a TV channel it is extremely important to have a well-equipped stu-
dio (for general attractiveness of the medium), be technically advanced and have profes-
sionals working on both content and technology. Together with British support ETV+ has 
built a new studio. BBC One provides Russian-speaking journalists in Estonia with capaci-
ty-building trainings. In particular, this means gaining practical experience on how to 
work in production, to film, to work with modern technologies etc.  
 
Nordic countries are also closely involved in the production process of ETV+’s own 
formats. The Nordic Council of Ministers’ Office in Estonia contributes to a development 
                                               
46 The order of countries does not indicate the dimension of the financial contribution. 
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of a local comic series named Lasnogorsk47. The idea of the series is to initiate, in a comical 
way, a self-reflecting public debate on how Russians or Russian-speaking Estonians see 
themselves, their integration and future in Estonia. The series can be compared with the 
German series Türkisch für Anfänger.   
 
Germany promotes an inclusive approach, building bridges not only with the minori-
ty group, but involving Estonians and stressing the need for multilateral cooperation. 
Combined projects among different ethnical groups (Estonian, Russian-speaking and 
German) and civil society actors (NGOs, foundations, activists, and media representa-
tives) strengthen intercultural exchange on the institutional as well as on a personal level 
and build a basis of mutual understanding.  
 
To increase media competence, Germany supports the Estonian media in two ways: it 
aims to create a network of journalists from Estonia and Germany, and it organises a 
number of workshops and seminars within this network on improving the quality of 
journalism. To this end, the German Embassy in Estonia initiated 2-3 day study tours to 
the two capitals Tallinn and Berlin for five Estonian and five German journalists. During 
the study tours, the journalists visited various state institutions and media outlets, partici-
pated in workshops on newsroom and/or modern radio production and strengthened the 
multi-/crossmedia partnership with German leading broadcasters (dpa, RBB, BR, SWR, 
Radio Bremen, ZDF and DW). According to the feedback of the Estonian participants 
from the newspaper Eesti Päevaleht and Postimees, this experience is particularly valuable 
for them, since they receive an opportunity to step into a conversation with German 
stakeholders and get a deeper insight into German politics. Both journalists stated, during 
an interview in May 2018 in Tallinn, that they were able to widen their knowledge and 
understanding of the German political mindset and broaden their sustainable professional 
network. As a positive result of the visit, both Estonian journalists increased their under-
standing of the recent cyber-attacks on the German parliament and used their knowledge 
in their everyday work back in Estonia. On the other hand, German journalists, as in the 
case of Radio Bremen, learned about innovative digital technologies in Estonia and used 
the know-how of local journalists in Estonia for creating programmes with a relatively 
small budget, which they afterwards implemented in Germany.  
 
                                               
47 A play on words with “Lasna” and “Gorsk” referring to a Russian-speaking district in Tallinn, similar to 
“Charlottengrad” in Berlin. 
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Deutsche Welle (DW) is another valuable partner for ERR. DW provides ERR with a set 
of its own content (documentaries, series etc.), which helps to fill the broadcasting pro-
gramme of the TV-channels on the one hand, and sets free a relatively small Estonian 
broadcasting budget for new projects on the other hand. 
 
Particularly important are the German support of ERR and the cooperation of Estoni-
an Television (ETV) and the Russian-speaking Television channel ETV+. By using an 
inclusive approach, Germany strengthens the cooperation of different editorial teams. 
Given the fact that Estonian broadcasting is divided by language criteria and by the inde-
pendence of editorial teams from each other in their decision-making and everyday work, 
there is a lack of exchange of content, format and experience between Estonian and Rus-
sian-speaking journalists. Partially, it is due to different needs and perceptions of the 
content by recipients. According to interviewed media experts, ethnic Estonians are used 
to a TV story of 7-8 minutes length, whereas the Russian-speaking consumer needs a more 
dynamic plot of maximum 4-5-minutes. Therefore, content exchange between the editori-
als is rather difficult, since both productions reach different needs of their target groups 
and need to use different instruments. On the other hand, the development of Russian 
language media and its integration into ERR structures was not a priority for a long time. 
This has further implications on the mindset of journalists, simply not thinking of the 
necessity of such cooperation. The old narrative was to integrate the Russian-speaking 
minority into Estonian society by teaching them the language and culture, which would 
automatically lead to an increase of Estonian media consumption and their participation 
in society. However, successful knowledge of the Estonian language is not the only indica-
tor for successful integration. Minority media was and is partially still today, less devel-
oped and less professional compared to Estonian media.  
 
6. Conclusions 
A strong shift in Russian communication strategy can be identified over the last ten years. 
Estonia is no longer an explicit target of Russian disinformation. Rather, it is an element of 
the whole “package” of influence measures directed towards the EU. Russian actors are 
studying the weaknesses of the EU member states and playing them out against the EU. 
The way Russia builds its disinformation strategy, mixing facts and fakes, distracting the 
recipient from the actual problems and misleading their attention to minor issues exag-
gerated in the media as well as using new technologies (trolls, bots etc.) poses a serious 
challenge to liberal democracy value-based societies in Europe. In Estonia the Russian 
minority is the most vulnerable group when it comes to Russian propaganda and disin-
formation campaigns. Partially, Russian media are successful in spreading Russian narra-
III. Communication strategy of Russia: a case study of Estonia by Juulia Barthel 
ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Understanding Russian Communication Strategy       50 
tives and achieving the support of the local minority group. This, however, does not pose 
a serious security threat to the Estonian state and a mass riot scenario similar to that of 
2007 is not likely anymore. A crucial part of the success of Estonia’s counter measures 
against Russian disinformation is the improvement of the integration and education poli-
cy towards the Russian minority. To recognise them as a part of Estonian society and to 
integrate them into the Estonian information space is an important way to counter Rus-
sia's impact on this group. 
 
Pushing a pro-European narrative among the Russian minority would be counter-
productive in Estonia, since they would probably perceive this as an act of “brainwash-
ing” or counterpropaganda. What Europeans can and should do, is: i) increase awareness 
of the problem of existing and skilfully targeted propaganda and disinformation cam-
paigns in our own home-countries, ii) strengthen resilience within our own societies and 
promote cooperation among the member-states, iii) strengthen the role of media literacy 
and media ethics (transparency and fact-based coverage).  
 
7. Appendix: List of participating institutions 
  German Embassy in Estonia 
  Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
  Estonian Ministry of Social Affairs 
  Estonian Defence Ministry 
  University of Tartu 
  Narva College of the University of Tartu 
  International Center for Defence and Security 
  Newspaper “Postimees”  
  Journal Diplomaatia 
  Newspaper “Eesti Päevaleht” 
  Governmental office, StratCom department 
  ETV+ editorial 
  National Estonian Broadcasting (ERR) 
  Member of the Estonian Parliament, IRL party 
 
IV. Comparison and conclusion by Stefan Meister 
51                ifa Edition Culture and Foreign Policy Understanding Russian Communication Strategy 
IV.  Comparison and conclusion by Stefan Meister 
A fundamental difference between both countries is that while in Estonia the government 
and society are aware of Russian influence and disinformation campaigns and are the key 
partner who demand external support from the EU, in Serbia many government actors are 
playing the pro-Russian card and benefitting from business with Russian companies. 
While Estonia is a member of the EU and NATO and an overall majority of society sup-
ports the idea of liberal democracy and market economy, in Serbia it is still an open ques-
tion, when the membership towards the EU will come and if the ruling elites are really 
interested in the transformation towards democracy, rule of law and a market economy. 
Serbian government representatives do not only closely cooperate with Russian state 
institutions they also promote Serbian nationalism and Slavic brotherhood with Russia. 
Playing the Russia card and anti-EU and anti-NATO sentiments are very common in the 
ruling party or their nationalistic partners. As a result, the key partners for Russian infor-
mation campaigns and influencers are in the government and in leading media. While in 
Estonia civil society, journalists and state actors are key partners in countering Russian 
propaganda and disinformation, in Serbia this role is taken up nearly exclusively by non-
state actors while ruling elites use narratives of Russian propaganda.  
 
The political and social situation in Serbia challenges any external activities from EU 
member states in the field of information policy with regard to their credibility. The num-
ber of partners for counter-measures is much smaller in Serbia than in Estonia and these 
actors are much weaker. Even worse, the public and political environment is becoming 
increasingly EU- and NATO-critical and might be hostile against external influence. At the 
same time, there is a need to increase information activities by the EU to counter false 
information and stereotypes in Serbian society which are supported by Russian and Serbi-
an propaganda. We have to bear in mind that Germany still has a positive image in Serbia 
and with its economic and social activities it has soft power in the country, which can be 
better used in the information sphere. To show and explain German and EU activities in 
and benefits for Serbia can be positive for the image of the values the German government 
and the EU promote. 
 
Therefore, if one wants to counter Russian propaganda und disinformation in both 
countries one needs different strategies and narratives. While Estonian society seems to be 
pretty resilient against Russian disinformation campaigns, the EU is losing ground in 
Serbia. In Estonia the main vulnerable target group is the Russian-speaking minority, in 
Serbia it is more or less the whole of society and especially the young generation. These 
two case studies show that the better state institutions function, the higher the trust is in 
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the state and media. Moreover, if the state interacts with civil society it is easier to respond 
to attacks in the information sphere. This means, a successful counter-communication 
strategy needs to be in line with a policy of strengthening institutions and good govern-
ance. An isolated information strategy will not be successful.  
 
The success story of Russian propaganda and disinformation in Serbia is based on the 
vulnerable political, economic and social environment. In Serbian society Russia has a 
positive image which is based on historical ties but also emotions in the context of the 
Serbian failure in the Yugoslavian wars in the 1990s. Furthermore, a Russophile base in 
politics, media and the public is directly spreading Russian disinformation. This is com-
pletely the opposite to Estonia, where Russian activities are first of all seen as a security 
threat and the independence from the Soviet Union is guaranteed only by EU and NATO 
membership for a majority of the society. Estonian elites have understood that they need 
to integrate the Russian-speaking minority, invest in education and address these groups 
with media and information which are in line with their media behaviour.  
 
A key question for the manipulation of the public sphere is media ownership and the 
independence of media. While in Serbia media is underfunded and is largely dependent 
on business people close to the government, in Estonia independent state media plays a 
bigger role. Free media content has become important to the business model of especially 
local and regional media outlets. A strong focus in the conclusion is on the support of 
local and regional media which is so far not the aim of foreign funding. The quality of 
Russian media and Russian-funded media is much better in Serbia than in Estonia which 
has something to do with the language and priority of funding. Larger funding of Russian 
activities in Serbia compared to Estonia means that in the view of Russian decision-
makers the success of the Russian campaign is more likely and Serbia a more important 
and easier target. At the same time, in Estonia the main target groups are the Russian 
speakers, who watch Russian state TV anyway. It makes no sense to invest heavily in 
Russian foreign media outlets in such a country.   
 
Whereas in Serbia the funding should be concentrated on non-state actors, this is dif-
ferent to Estonia, where state and non-states actors cooperate much closer. It is important 
for both countries to have less bureaucratised and more flexible funding instruments and 
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There are more general conclusions which can be taken from both studies: 
  The media are at the heart of democratic societies, worldwide, they are undergo-
ing a credibility crisis as a result of a business-model crisis in the context of the 
digital revolution. Transparency about sources of information is crucial; there-
fore, it is important to improve the quality of media and investigative journal-
ism. There is a need to invest in the analysis of disinformation, fake news, and 
cyberattacks worldwide, and to explain to societies how disinformation works. It 
is crucial to reveal and make propaganda structures visible. This is a task not 
just of the media, think tanks and the expert community, but also of politicians 
and civil society. To invest in the quality of independent journalism is crucial for 
any activity in the information sphere. 
  Much of the success of Russian disinformation is due to the vulnerabilities of the 
societies it targets. While in Estonia it is the lack of integration of the Russian 
minority and the division of this group in the education system, in Serbia it is 
the lack of clarity of the political and social transformation as well as the instru-
mentalisation of nationalistic sentiments and frustration in society by the politi-
cal elites. Societies and governments need to do their homework in terms of re-
forms, social demands, and the roots of growing populism. Many of their vul-
nerabilities are homemade and can be solved only by societies and elites them-
selves. Strengthening resilience also means improving education, media literacy, 
strong, pluralistic media, our own narratives and active communication. In Ser-
bia the EU integration process and funding instruments should be used as con-
ditionality for the improvement of the environment for civil society, media and 
the legal system. 
  There is a need for a comprehensive, joint approach and response among the EU 
member states. To learn from each other, to study and compare different cases 
can help to better understand own vulnerabilities and learn counter-measures 
from others. It is crucial to improve the coordination of counter-measures with 
political institutions and civil society nationally, and also among the member 
states and the institutions of the EU, and to strengthen those institutions at the 
EU- and NATO-level that deal with these issues. Institutions like the EU’s Strat-
Com are currently underfunded and lack the mandate to become a crucial and 
credible player in the creation of counter-measures. It might make sense to 
change the role of this institution to collect and coordinate information from the 
EU member states. But for this purpose, the EU’s StratCom needs to become 
more operational.  
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  In countries like Serbia, an isolated information strategy makes no sense. It is 
important to combine the support of transformation and reforms with more EU 
(communication) presence in the country. Here an active EU ambassador is vital 
and improved coordination among EU-member states’ representatives in the re-
spective country – in terms of a communication strategy and for countering Rus-
sian propaganda – would be easy first steps. It is important that the society has 
the impression EU-member states care about the future of Serbia, which has 
been successfully communicated in Estonia by German officials before and after 
its accession to the EU. These studies underline that there is a need to under-
stand the particular political, social and historical environment to address a suc-
cessful communication strategy towards a country. This environment will define 
the room for manoeuvre in which EU member states can act. To transfer the 
same instruments and narratives from one country to another can be counter-
productive. The Russian information campaign is a good case study to under-
stand how this adaptation can take place successfully. 
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Understanding Russian Communication 
Strategy  
Case Studies of Serbia and Estonia 
“There is a need to invest in the analysis of disin-
formation, fake news, and cyber attacks worldwi-
de, and to explain to societies how disinformation 
works. It is crucial to reveal and make propagan-
da structures visible. This is a task not just of the 
media, the think tanks and the expert communi-
ty, but also of politicians and civil society.” 
As a part of Russian soft (or coercive) power 
disinformation and propaganda have become 
key elements in Russian security policy since 
2012/13.  
This study analyses Russia‘s communication 
strategy with regard to its influence in Serbia and 
Estonia. What are the tools that are used? What 
are the aims behind disinformation and fake 
news stories?
It shows that a formerly reactive response from a 
perceived position of weakness has turned into a 
well-executed communication strategy that ma-
kes use of vulnerabilities to sow discord. National 
elites in the target countries play a key role for 
the success or failure of this policy.
